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ART. I. — SOCIAL EVILS, AND THEIR REMEDY.

WE have never pretended, and we do not now pretend, to be able to point out any specific remedy for social evils, or to show how a series of causes may be put in operation, which shall prevent their recurrence.

In the greater part of what we have written in the pages of this Journal, as well as elsewhere, on the subject of social evils, our main purpose has been to bring the subject itself distinctly before the minds of those among us, who give tone to thought and direction to affairs, and to engage them in its serious and earnest consideration. The remedy itself we have expected only as the result of time, and the general activity of the public mind directed to its discovery.

But the subject has finally begun to arrest the attention of the community. Throughout the whole length and breadth of the land, men's minds are busy with it. The problem has come up, and will not down till its solution, at least to a partial extent, is found. We may, then, now desist from our efforts to provoke discussion, and proceed to discuss. The audience is assembled, and a calm, dispassionate, philosophical discussion will now be listened to with eagerness and respect.

Though we confess, in the outset, that we have no

specific remedy for social evils to bring forward, yet we feel competent to indicate the method the inquirer must take in order to find one, and the law by which it is to be applied. And this we proceed now to do, as briefly and as clearly as we can.

The end the Reformer contemplates, and seeks to gain, is the production of harmony, the realization of order in the bosom of the individual, between the various elements and tendencies of his nature, and in the bosom of society, between its several members, and between its members and itself.

The power which we have for accomplishing this end is our activity, or free-agency. This power may or may not be adequate, but it is all that we have, and we can go no further than it can carry us.

But we may make of our activity a two-fold application, and realize the end sought, directly, by efforts to control the appetites and passions; and indirectly, through institutions, by efforts to make them bear on our passivity, and, so far as we are passive beings, aid in moulding us into the sort of beings we should be.

Moral and religious teachers rely chiefly on the first application of free-agency. They proceed on the ground, that direct efforts of free-will in the interior of man are adequate to the realization of order, let external institutions and influences be what they may. They have proceeded on this ground for six thousand years, and with results, which ought ere this to have convinced them that they were guilty of some mistake. In our appetites and passions, from which all disturbing forces proceed, there is at work an activity, which, strictly speaking, is not our activity, and which ours can at best control only to a limited extent. "Evil communications corrupt good manners." Institutions, moral, religious, social, civil, and political, have an almost irresistible influence in determining our characters. Within certain limits they are absolute, and mould us in spite of ourselves. Instead, then, of exhorting men to be what they ought to be, or wasting ourselves in fruitless efforts to make them what they ought to be, in

spite of these institutions, against the resistance they offer, we should modify, alter, or reconstruct them, so that they shall aid in the production and maintenance of the individual character desired. We cannot carry the river over the mountain, for the law of gravitation is against us; but we can tunnel the mountain, and then the same law of gravitation which before was against us, will operate in our favor, and cause the river to flow in the direction we wish it to flow.

In plain words, the doctrine we would lay down is this: Individual character is the result of the combined action of free-will and necessity, and is to be made what it should be mainly by the efforts of free-will not to overcome necessity, but to avail itself of necessity; as in constructing a mill we avail ourselves of the law of gravitation to drive our machinery. The problem to be solved, then, is, how to modify institutions, whose action on us is that of necessity, so that they shall always aid the growth of individual virtue and happiness.

This problem can never be completely solved. The harmony, the order we are in pursuit of, may be approximated, but we are far from believing that it can ever be fully attained. There is a necessary antagonism in human nature itself, which must forever balk and baffle our wisest and most strenuous efforts to realize perfect peace and harmony in either the bosom of the individual, or in that of society. Man is in his nature a limited, that is, an incomplete, an imperfect being. He has in him elements of growth, of progress, but not of perfection. He can, then, never become, in the strict sense of the word, a perfect being. If he could, he could become God. Society has its root in human nature, and can never surpass the capabilities of that nature. These capabilities reach to progress, but not to perfection; consequently, while we may hope for a continued progress of society towards perfection, we must forever despair of its attaining to perfection.

Man has a two-fold nature. One set of instincts and faculties, which centre in himself, and another set,

whose centre is out of himself. By the first set, he is an individual, is affected by what immediately concerns himself, and induced to look out for himself, to assert and maintain his own personal rights, interests, and dignity. By the second, he is rendered social, capable of binding himself by love and duty to others, and of becoming self-denying, disinterested, and heroic. Between these two sets of instincts and faculties, there is, and there must be, in the very nature of things, antagonism; consequently, the struggle, the combat, the victory, the defeat. This antagonism will reproduce itself in society, and render the struggle there as permanent and as fierce as it is in the bosom of the individual.

Both of these sets of instincts and faculties, or elements of our being, are in their nature indestructible and essential to man. The individual element, the abuse of which is selfishness, is not less essential to man than the social, disinterested, or heroic. It is the element of liberty and of progress. If destroyed, or denied its legitimate scope, the individual is no longer regarded; his well-being is neglected; all individuality expires; society becomes supreme, and exerts the most absolute and galling sway over all her members. On the other hand, if we destroy or neglect the social element, the disinterested, the heroic, we have no social bond, no union, no coöperation, no mutual assistance, no protection for even individuality itself. For all individuality being exclusive, infinitely repellant to every other individuality, each would seek its own gratification at the expense of another; one would prey upon another, the stronger would oppress the weaker, and we should have but one unvarying scene of wrongs and outrages, tyranny and slavery, anarchy, confusion, and war.

Every scheme of reform which overlooks or neglects either of these elements, as well as every scheme which proposes a perfection beyond the capabilities of human nature, must prove abortive, and be merely a monument to the want of practical wisdom in its author.

This fact Reformers are prone to overlook. For ourselves, we have never yet seen a scheme proposed for

either individual or social reform, that did not either neglect one or the other of these elements, or contemplate a perfection, to which neither human nature nor human society can attain.

Mr. Fourier has given us an example of a scheme of this latter sort. His scheme, as ably and faithfully developed in Mr. Brisbane's interesting and valuable volume on the Social Destiny of Man, is ingenious and striking, and at first view attractive, and even plausible. He recognises the antagonism which actually obtains in both the individual and society, and proposes to get rid of it by harmonizing the passions. His scheme may, therefore, be called a scheme of *passional* harmonies, to be produced not by denying, destroying, or subduing the passions, but by affording to each its legitimate gratification. This would, no doubt, succeed, were man only a perfect being, or capable of becoming perfect. Were he so made, that all his passions could be gratified, and so that he would always be satisfied when the passions had attained their special gratification, a scheme of *passional* harmony might be contemplated with some degree of practical wisdom, as well as with enthusiastic hope; but man, from the very fact, that he is and always must be imperfect, incomplete, is incapable of having all his passions harmonized. He is a musical instrument, that can neither be put nor kept in perfect tune. He was made for progress. Progress consists in overcoming disharmony; and unless it is one day to cease, implies that disharmony can never be entirely overcome.

Moreover, each passion seeks its own special gratification, and can rarely obtain it without thwarting another. It is impossible, for instance, to harmonize benevolence and the love of accumulation; for one finds its gratification in giving away, the other in acquiring and hoarding. Nature, again, is no economist. She secures her ends by an excessive expenditure of means. The end she proposes to secure by any given passion is always good and sacred, but in order to secure it, she lavishes the passion in excess. Take the passion of

love, given to secure the continuance of the species. Wherever this passion exists in sufficient strength and activity to ensure the end for which it was given, it exists in a degree which would push us beyond that end. It demands more than the other elements of our being, without self-denial, can yield it. Restrain it, and it rebels, and makes a disturbance; let it go unrestrained, it becomes morbidly active, destroys the equilibrium of the passions, and both the moral and physical well-being of the individual. And what we say of this passion, we may say of all the passions.

Nor is this all. There is no passion satisfied by possession. Each has a tendency to enlarge its desires in proportion as it obtains. On wishes, wishes grow, and one demand is no sooner complied with, than another and a larger is made. The harmony of all the passions is, therefore, out of the question.

The harmony of the passions, so far as attainable, is to be obtained not by gratifying the desires of each, but by denying to each its special gratification, whenever its special gratification would lead to disorder, either in the bosom of the individual or in that of society; that is, by following the Christian rule, deny thyself, which we shall find but poorly substituted by Mr. Fourier's rule, — please thyself. In fact, the pleasure of self-denial often exceeds that of indulgence. But in all self-denial there is antagonism.

Mr. Owen's community scheme is an example of a different sort. It has some good points. It recognises the influence of institutions, of "circumstances," in forming our characters, and for this it deserves commendation; but it overlooks several essential elements or wants of human nature. In denying the innateness and indestructibleness of the religious element of man, Mr. Owen proves himself a careless psychologist, and a superficial philosopher. This element is essential to man, and is one of the stronger elements of his being. No scheme of society is practicable, that neglects it, and none were desirable, even if practicable. It must have a prominent place in every plan of social reorganization

intended to be acceptable to the race, or permanent and beneficial.

Mr. Owen also neglects activity, free-agency, and, therefore, strictly speaking, man himself. In his scheme, man is the mere creature of circumstances. He has, then, in himself, no active power. He cannot create or modify his Creator. What, then, can he do by way of reform? By denying free-agency, Mr. Owen denies the very instrument with which he must work, and without which it would be absurd to call upon man to be a reformer. Man is active as well as passive, and can act on and mould circumstances as well as they him.

In contending for a community system, Mr. Owen depresses, if he does not wholly destroy, individuality. He seizes on the social or communal element of our nature. This is, unquestionably, the element of union, order, justice, peace; but, when taken exclusively, it makes the community everything, the individual nothing; establishes the absolute authority of the community, which cannot fail to degenerate into practical tyranny, under which both liberty and progress become impossible.

The right of property is denied, too, by his scheme of a community of goods. A community of goods cannot coexist with property; for all property is individual, exclusive. The tenure by which property is held in some countries, and the mode of its transmission and reappropriation in all, may need some important modifications; but the right to property itself is one of our primitive rights, and is, therefore, sacred and divine. Properly speaking, man never feels himself man, till he has something to which he can point and say, "that is mine; touch it not, save as I give thee leave." It is idle to war against this right, for it is indestructible in the human soul; it is wrong to do it, because we should respect all the rights of man, and because its recognition and security have been and ever must be a powerful agent in advancing civilization.

Mr. Owen, also, in our judgment, errs, by denying

the necessity of marriage laws. The actual laws on marriage, in most countries, may, doubtless, need some ameliorations, but the continuance of the marriage relation cannot be left to the discretion of the parties interested, with safety either to society or the parties themselves. Marriage is not a mere private agreement, nor civil contract even, but also a sacrament, and should, therefore, be placed under safeguard of both religion and law. The passion usually most active in leading to marriage is good and holy, as are all the passions; but reason and morality are not sufficient to keep it within bounds. All the passions have a tendency to grow tired of what is familiar, and to crave what is novel. Make the continuance of the marriage relation a mere matter of caprice, as it would be, if all laws on the subject were abrogated, and it would not be seldom that we should find a man divorcing the wife of yesterday to take another that strikes his fancy to-day, who will be equally distasteful to-morrow, and must in her turn give way to another.

Doubtless there are evils, to which married life is now subject, that it were desirable to remedy. Marriage is not always that solace and relief to man's estate it should be. We have ourselves, on a former occasion,* entered our indignant protest against the unhallowed restraint which society exercises over the indulgence of the affections. But the evils complained of are the result of causes which operate before the marriage law takes effect, and are deeply seated in the artificiality of the present social organization, — in its family pride, its factitious distinctions of blood and fortunes, which interrupt the natural course of young affection, and but too often make marriage a mere legalized prostitution, a mere contrivance for uniting families and estates, or for acquiring a fortune. Abolish your factitious distinctions, do away with your gross inequalities of fortune, educate and refine all your children, make honest industry honorable, and so profitable, that a young couple may always

* See Quarterly Review, Vol. III. No. XI. Article *Laboring Classes*.

feel that they will be able to secure a comfortable living by their own labor, and that too *without losing caste*, and the evils now complained of will in a great measure cease to exist.

Mr. Owen, paradoxical as it may seem, relies too much on reason and morality. But these are feeble barriers against passion in its vehemence. We have these now, and law to boot, and yet passion laughs us in the face, not seldom bids us defiance, and goes unwhipt of justice. They may do for those who are naturally frigid, and for those who are "too old to sin," but to rely on them alone for the great mass of mankind, were to open the door to unbridled lust, and its whole desolating train. We should do all in our power so to reorganize society that it shall minister no unnatural stimulus to the passions, but we should also stand ready with law in our hands, to whip them back whenever they undertake to leap their bounds.

This leads us to the conclusion, that they who contemplate reforming society without the aid of government, or introducing a state of society in which government will be superfluous, are also far remote from true practical reformers. This class of reformers are becoming somewhat numerous in our own community. They are a class for whom we have great respect, and among whom we reckon some of our warmest personal friends. They admit the present existence of the antagonism of which we speak, but they think that by a judicious system of moral, intellectual, religious, and physical culture they can overcome it.

But have they reflected on what condition and at what cost they must overcome it, if they overcome it at all? They have a lively sense of individual rights, and they regard government not only as superfluous, but as an unjust restraint upon individual freedom. Now individual freedom and well-being are promoted only by what are called the selfish instincts, or rather those which lead the individual to assert and maintain his own rights and dignity. We have seen already the result to which we must come, if we take our point of

departure in exclusive individuality. Exclusive individuality destroys all individuality, because one individuality cannot tolerate another. You must then control individuality by bringing up the social element. But in order to control it, or rather as our friends propose, subdue it, you must give supremacy to the social element. You must weaken the sense of individuality, and strengthen the sense of society. Now if this be done so far as to get rid of all antagonism, it is done only by the entire suppression of individuality. This would be, if successful, so to enfeeble, to emasculate man, that he would be utterly incapable of fulfilling the functions of his being. He would no longer seek to provide for himself, to prolong his own existence, or even to contribute to the continuance of the species.

To this extent the suppression of individuality is impossible. The element will survive all efforts to destroy it, and exert itself legitimately or illegitimately. The practical effect, therefore, of the effort to destroy it and dispense with civil government, would be to reëstablish a theocracy, the worst and weightiest of all tyranny. The success of our no-government friends, on either hand, would be their defeat. Seeking freedom, they would find slavery; scope for individual activity, they would find themselves without power to act; progress, they would obtain immobility; relief from the burdens of civil government, they would be pressed to the earth by the overwhelming weight of the hierarchy.

These reformers proceed on the ground, that what they term the lower nature of man is too active. They regard, whether aware of it or not, the selfish instincts as immoral; and they place morality in the exclusive exercise of the social, the disinterested, the heroic. These are the higher nature, those the lower. The lower should submit to the higher; and government is now necessary only because the lower are *unduly* active. Government, has, therefore, its necessity in human wickedness, and of course must become unnecessary just in proportion as men become upright and moral. This is

the view taken of human nature by all theocrats, and is the view on which are founded the claims of supremacy set up by the church. This view, taken exclusively, depresses the body, the state, all material interests, and exalts the soul, the church, and spiritual interests generally. It generates mysticism, asceticism, contempt of the world; builds monasteries, nunneries, and establishes the unlimited authority of the priests. The evils of its dominance may be seen through all past history, and in all countries still subjected to a theocratic government.

For ourselves, we protest against this exclusive spiritualism. The soul is no more holy than the body; and morality attaches necessarily no more to the exercise of what is called the higher nature, than to what is called the lower nature. We may be as moral in the exercise of the functions of the body as in the exercise of the functions of the soul, in yielding to the selfish instincts as in yielding to the disinterested. Morality is predicable only of the *motive* with which we act; it matters not whether the *mobile* to act be furnished by one set of instincts or another. The selfish instincts, as they are called, are neither effects nor evidences of the Fall, but are as primitive in man and are as necessary to make up the glory and excellence of his character, as the disinterested and heroic. They should not be cursed, nor should there be any effort to get rid of them. According to Christianity the antithesis between body and soul, insisted upon by the old religions, is done away, and now we should write "Holiness to the Lord," on everything. Man's whole nature rightly exercised, is alike holy.

The selfish instincts, within their legitimate sphere, are as worthy to be obeyed as the disinterested and benevolent; and it is necessary for the well-being of both the individual and the race, that they be always the strongest and most active. The good of the whole is best provided for by making each individual the special guardian of his own.

But if these instincts be the strongest and the most

active, the others will be too weak to control them, and to prevent one individuality from occasionally encroaching on the equal individuality of another. This encroaching neither the individual nor the race can tolerate. Both morality and utility demand its suppression. Hence the necessity of society for perfecting the individual, — society, which may be defined the union of all for the protection of each.

Man has primitive and indestructible wants which crave society and lead to it; he has also instincts essential, as we have shown, to his very existence, and to that of the race, which must be stronger and more active than those, that demand the supervision and control of society. These too are permanent and indestructible, and consequently create a permanent demand for social supervision and control.

But social supervision and control is government; consequently government has an eternal necessity in the permanent and essential nature of man. Society is needed to maintain, in all its entirety, the equal individuality of each and every of her members; and government is the force needed to enable her to do this, and to enable the aggrieved party to compel her to do it, in case she neglects or refuses to do it.

Now as the great work for the social reformer is to provide for the maintenance to each and every individual to his entire individuality, and as this can be done only by society, and by society through government, it follows that government, so far from being an obstacle to reform, a superfluous machine which we should throw aside, is in fact the great and indispensable agent of reform. They, then, who are warring against government, are warring against themselves, throwing away the arms without which their defeat is certain. Instead of advocating their no-government schemes, they should plunge into the science of politics, acquaint themselves with practical statesmanship, and turn the purity of their hearts, the intelligence of their minds, and the enthusiasm of their souls to the work of making government what it ought to be.

We have arrived now at two important conclusions. 1. Man is to be perfected in society ; and 2. Society is to be perfected, that is, enabled or compelled to discharge its office in perfecting the individual, by the agency of government.

It follows also from what we have said, that the office of society, so far as concerns our present inquiry, is to maintain for each individual member his entire individuality. This implies the maintenance not only of one individuality against another, but also of the individual against society itself.

The maintenance of each member of society in his entire individuality, is what is commonly meant by maintaining equal rights. But the phrase equal rights does not necessarily cover the whole ground. Rights may be equal without being entire. Society may maintain equal rights, that is, the same number of rights to each of her members, and yet to no one all his rights. She may maintain all the rights of one individual in relation to another, and yet deny to all their rights in relation to herself. We prefer, therefore, the statement we have adopted, which means, for us, all the rights with which the individual is endowed by his Creator, whether they relate to other individuals or to society.

In contending, that it is the office of society to maintain each and every individual in his entire individuality, we of course reject the old doctrine, that the rights of society are made up of the rights surrendered by individuals. Men on coming into civil society do not surrender a portion of their rights for the sake of enjoying the remainder ; man comes in, if the expression *comes in* be allowed, for the purpose of having all and every of his rights protected, even to the minutest and apparently the most insignificant. Every member of society, that is, every citizen, — and every one who is properly a man should be a citizen, — has the right to demand the protection here implied, and society fails in her duty, whenever she fails from any cause whatever to afford it.

The rights of the individual may be invaded in two ways. 1. By the encroachment of one individual upon

another. 2. By the encroachment of society herself. The practical political problem then is, how to organize civil society, or how to constitute the government, so as to afford an effective guaranty to all against this double invasion. Government, to meet the exigencies of the case, must be an instrument in the hands of society for protecting one individual against another, and in the hands of individuals for protecting themselves against the encroachments of society. It must then be a contrivance for governing society as well as individuals.

A contrivance of this sort it is not easy to find. It presents the only really difficult problem in political science. Some have thought they found it in monarchy, some in aristocracy, some in democracy, and others in various combinations of these, or in what they have termed mixed governments. In this country the popular solution of the problem is the democratic. We fancy that we find in democracy the form of government needed, and that if we so arrange matters, that the will of the people can always make itself felt and obeyed, all rights are sure to be protected, and the interests and well-being of all secured.

But democracy, as popularly taught, affords the citizen no protection against society. By democracy, as a form of government, is understood generally that form of government in which the people, taken as the state or body politic, are supreme, and may, if not morally, at least in point of fact, do whatever they please. The state is then absolute, and you have an unlimited government, just as much as you would have, were your government an unlimited monarchy. Minorities and individuals have nothing but the wisdom and justice of the majority on which to rely. They are at the mercy of the sovereign, and have no resource if he choose to play the tyrant. Here is no true liberty, no effective safeguard for individual freedom, no power in the hands of the party whose rights may be invaded, except the good pleasure of the invader, with which to obtain redress.

We speak here of democracy in its absolute sense,

and solely as a form of government. Democracy, when understood to mean the end that government should seek, to wit, the maintenance of each individual in the free and full possession of all his natural rights as a man, is unquestionably the creed of every true American, and as one of our distinguished scholars has well said, "practical Christianity;" for in this sense it realizes in our social and political relations the end enjoined by the fundamental principles of the Christian religion. But the growing tendency of our countrymen is to understand by democracy a form of government in which the majority, the absolute numerical majority, may rule unrestrained. The government of this country is regarded as resting solely on the will of the majority. In the words of the late President of the United States, "a breath of the majority has made and can unmake" it. Hence we hear of the "democracy of numbers," and are told on high authority that the "democracy of numbers" is the only intelligible democracy. Then the majority is always the democracy; the party in the majority is always the true democratic party, and the principles and measures of the majority are always democratic principles and measures. Majorities are perpetually shifting. The minority of yesterday is the majority of to-day, and of course what was anti-democratic yesterday is democratic to-day, and will be anti-democratic again to-morrow.

There is among us a strong tendency to sweep away every institution, every organic form, whether in the executive, judicial, or legislative branches of the government, which may have heretofore interposed an obstacle to the free and full expression of the irresponsible will of the majority. Every amendment proposed or adopted of any of our civil constitutions has a direct tendency to throw additional power into the hands of the party, which chances to be in the majority, and to remove some safeguard from the minority. The whole spirit of the American people, not of one party only, is to sweep away all barriers to the establishment of absolute democracy, which shall cause the govern-

ment in its administration to feel and respond to every wave of public opinion, or popular caprice. This is easily accounted for, and is by no means an unnatural tendency ; but it is perhaps time to inquire whither it is likely to lead, and whether it is likely to increase the security we demand for individual rights ?

We are aware that there is growing up among us a feeling, that majorities can do no wrong, but we have not yet satisfied ourselves that this feeling has any warrant in theory or experience. Majorities, for aught we can see, are as liable to err as minorities. The truly wise and just man not seldom finds himself obliged to desert the majority, nay to stand alone with his single breast against an opposing world. Not seldom is he jeered and scoffed by the multitude, his name a by-word and a reproach.

Our democrats, however, contend that the interests of the majority are in point of fact identical with the interests of the minority, and therefore if the majority can actually be free to promote their own, they will of necessity promote the interests of the whole. All that is necessary, then, is universal education, which shall enable all to see and comprehend their rights and interests, and the measures necessary to secure them ; and universal suffrage, by which every man shall have a voice in determining the action of the government. This is plausible, but nevertheless unsatisfactory to those who look at things as they are.

Admit for the present, that the will of the majority, freely expressed, and rendered effective, will secure to every individual the free and full enjoyment of all his natural rights, still universal suffrage coupled even with universal education of the most approved pattern, will by no means secure the free and effective expression of the actual will of the majority. The actual majority of our countrymen are the laboring men. But universal suffrage secures not the expression of their views, convictions, and wishes. They almost uniformly vote against themselves, not through ignorance, but what is to them a moral necessity. They must have employ-

ment, or they and theirs must beg, steal, or starve. This employment they feel that they can obtain only by voting with the small minority on whom they are dependent for it. They dare not vote independently, lest they lose their employment ; and consequently they are in elections little else but the servile tools of their employers. This fact is notorious, and it is no uncommon thing for a working man to shift his politics with his employer. Political leaders usually count, as so many votes for their party, the number of voters in the employ of their friends. The friends of the workingmen see and lament this, and seek, vainly, to get rid of the evil by means of the secret ballot.

But waiving this, there is another obstacle, if possible still greater. We suppose that all democratic communities will divide themselves into parties, especially if under the régime of pure, unmixed, unlimited democracy, and usually into two parties of nearly equal strength. There are permanent causes for this division in the antagonism of which we have already spoken. Whatever measure is carried, must then be carried by means of a party. If your party be not in the ascendancy, you cannot carry your measure. Your first study must then be to secure the ascendancy of your party. This can be done only by means of union and concert among all its members ; and union and concert can be obtained only by establishing and respecting what are termed party usages. These usages will require you to support the measures and candidates of your party.

But these measures and candidates are rarely determined on by the spontaneous voice of the whole party. They are determined on by the few more active partizans, usually designated party leaders. These cut and dry the policy of the party. The party may not approve this policy, but it must adopt it, or endanger its success, and give ascendancy to the opposing party ; which will generally be regarded as the greater evil of the two. A majority of the more active members of the party, therefore, adopt what their leaders propose, pass resolutions in its favor, and rally the

whole party to its support. The party, we will suppose, succeeds, elects its men and carries its measures. Are these measures really carried by the majority of the whole people? Are they in truth expressions of the actual will of the majority? Not at all. They are in truth only the expressions of the will or the policy of the active minority of the party, which is itself but a lean majority of the whole people. If the actual opinion of those who in both parties are really opposed to them could be collected, you would not unfrequently have an overwhelming majority against them. In point of fact, what we call the decision of the majority in this country, is rarely anything more than the decision of the active or adroit minority which controls the party, that for the time being chances to be in the ascendant. Universal suffrage then, coupled with universal education, cannot secure even the expression of the will of the majority, to say nothing of giving us assurance that the will of the majority shall always be just and right.

Nor is this all. Government, as soon as it goes into operation, divides the community into two classes, and creates an inequality, and an opposition of interests between the few and the many. It collects its taxes from the whole people indeed, but it pays them out to the few. These few consequently receive more from the government than they pay to it; and the many consequently pay more than they receive from it. The interest of the many is to pay as little as possible, and of the few to make them pay as much as possible. The few are, by their position and their relation to the government, constituted a plunder party, and they are induced by all the force of selfishness, which always increases by what it feeds upon, to make the government an instrument for plundering the people to the greatest possible extent. These few have the command of the government, for they are the small minority governing the ruling party. Now against these plunderers, these wielders of the whole organized power of the community, what are single individuals, however independent in their suffrages, or however moral and

enlightened in their aims? They are as the reed before the blast. They may be trampled on with impunity.

It may be said that they may denounce the party in power, raise the cry of "retrenchment and reform," and bring up and bring in a new party. Be it so. The chiefs of the new party as soon as in power will constitute a new plunder party, more greedy than the last, because they have for some time been keeping Lent. They will find "retrenchment and reform" difficult. The business of the country is increasing, new settlements are springing up, population is enlarging, interests and relations are multiplying, and demanding a larger number of public officers and additional expenditures. Every new party coming into power among us comes in on the cry of "retrenchment and reform;" but alas! each new one proves itself more burdensome than the last.

The security we demand for individuality, therefore, is not to be found in universal suffrage and universal education, good and indispensable as both unquestionably are. No unlimited form of government will answer our purpose; because every unlimited form of government establishes the absolute rule of society, and therefore deprives the individual of all guaranty for his individuality, — placing him entirely at the mercy of an arbitrary will, and as much so when that will is the will of the many, as when it is the will of the one or the few.

The individual, however enlightened and moral, we have seen is too weak to withstand the cupidity of the plunder party, which the party of the government always is, and always will be. He alone cannot protect his rights, or compel society to do it. In order to protect him you must league him with a part or a portion of the community, which shall make common cause with him, and have the power to arrest the action of government the moment it invades or threatens to invade his rights.

The framers of our institutions have not altogether

overlooked this. They have sought to protect minorities and individuals, by the separation of the functions of government into three departments, each in the main independent of the other; by dividing the legislative branch into two houses; and by the adoption of written constitutions defining the powers of each department, and of the whole government. They have had a horror of all absolute governments, and have sought to limit the government they established. They were wiser than we commonly represent them, and many of the checks and balances they introduced, which we are warring against, are of no small use in protecting minorities and individuals in their rights. They sought, in one word, to establish a CONSTITUTIONAL government, a government of limited powers, containing in itself a power of arresting its own action whenever disposed to transcend its legitimate bounds.

This idea is fundamental and just. Constitutional government is the only government under which there can be any real liberty, any effective safeguard for the rights, the individuality of the citizen; and it will be a sad day for us, when in obedience to monarchical, aristocratical, or democratical tendencies, we are led to abandon constitutional forms of government for an absolute government.

Our countrymen are in general strongly attached to constitutional forms of government, and have no intention of weakening or abandoning them, but they do not, as it appears to us, always fully comprehend the precise nature of constitutional government. It is generally admitted that the constitution prescribes the mode and the limits within which the several departments of the government shall act; but it is not always perceived that the constitution is in fact only so much waste paper, if it proceed from the same power which performs the ordinary functions of government and legislation. The ordinary power of government and legislation, in a government like ours, is the will or assent of the majority. Now if this same majority make the constitution, or may unmake it at will, the

constitution can at best impose only a temporary check on its will. It is as absolute as if there were no constitution at all. Does the constitution emanate from the simple numerical majority of the people? Then it is nothing but a self-imposed restraint, a charter granted by the sovereign, but revocable at will. Have the majority an absolute right, or the absolute power, of interpreting the constitution, of determining the meaning of its provisions? Then the constitution is nothing but what the majority choose to make it, and consequently we are just as much under the absolute majority, as we should be in case we had no constitution. Nor will it alter the case if a special umpire for deciding on the constitutionality of questions be instituted, if that umpire be appointed by the majority, or be so constituted as naturally to express the sense of the majority.

It is essential to constitutional government, that the constitution be made by a different power from the one which acts in ordinary legislation, and that it rest for its support on a power which can effectively maintain it, in case the government proper manifests a disposition to transcend its limits. The people assembled in convention differs in no respect from the people assembled in the halls of legislation, as to the actual power which is at work. If the delegates chosen to the convention represent the numerical majority of the people, what do they represent but the very majority represented by the members of the legislature, in case that legislature be based solely on population? We want in fact in the state two powers, which shall serve to restrain each the other. One of these powers should make the constitution, the other should operate within the limits of that constitution in the performance of the ordinary functions of government. The constitution is then a real check on ordinary government and legislation, the real sovereign of the country, of which government in its restricted sense is merely the agent or minister.

This constitution-making power we have not in all cases provided for. In our own Commonwealth, the

same power, with a slight restriction, that makes the laws, can alter the constitution. The constitution with us is only what the will of the majority makes it, or suffers it to be. It is in fact then no restriction on the power of the majority. It is only the restriction the majority imposes on itself during its pleasure.

But how are we to obtain a constitution-making power different from the power of the majority? We must do it, if we may borrow the words of a distinguished American statesman,* "by means of some contrivance for collecting the sense of the community through its parts." By the concurrence of the several parts we form the constitution, which must be the enumeration and limit of the powers to be exercised by the simple numerical majority.

A contrivance of this sort would give us a double majority; the simple, absolute, numerical majority of the whole community, and the concurring majorities of the several parts. The concurring majorities of the parts would be the sense of a much larger portion of the community than is represented by the numerical majority, and would also embody the sense of parts, which might have interests and wishes different from those of the numerical majority. So long as this sense could be effectively expressed, no part could be injured, and the numerical majority would be obliged to confine its action to those matters and interests which were common to the whole. The concurring majorities, or the sense of the community as collected through its parts, should make the constitution. The numerical majority should operate only within the limits of the constitution.

Take, as an illustration of this, the constitution of the United States. This constitution was not formed by nor does it rest on the will of the majority of the people of the United States, as contended by the late President in his Inaugural Address; but was formed and can be altered only by the concurring major-

* John C. Calhoun.

ities of the several States. It embodies the sense of the American community as collected through its parts, without reference to absolute numbers. The sense of Rhode Island, as an independent part, counts as much in forming or amending the constitution as the sense of New York. The majority of the whole people can therefore legitimately exert no more power than will be concurred in by the several parts, or to speak strictly no power that one fourth of the parts withhold. The constitution is therefore an example of what we term concurring majorities, or majorities of the several parts. The law-making power of Congress, on the other hand, is an example of the absolute or numerical majority, and being limited by the constitution, is restricted, restrained in its exercise by the concurring majorities.

A contrivance analogous or equivalent to this, is needed in the several States. But here it is less easy to introduce it, because interests and localities are more homogeneous, and it is more difficult to organize the community into distinct parts. To introduce some distinction of the kind, some contrivance for taking, in addition to the sense of the absolute majority, the sense of the natural divisions of the community, is and should be the aim of every true statesman. Universal suffrage collects, after a sort, it is true, the sense of the parts; but these parts are simple individuals, and the simple individual is too weak, as we have shown, to constitute a sufficient barrier to the invasion of the numerical majority, or rather the plundering minority that controls it. How it shall be introduced we do not now undertake to point out. The contrivance must vary with localities and the peculiar habits, tastes, customs, and pursuits of the community. The same contrivance will not answer for every community. Nor can it anywhere be arbitrarily introduced. It must ever be merely a modification or development of what already exists. In Rome it was obtained by the establishment of the Tribunitial power. In England it is obtained by means of Three Estates, each having a negative on the

others ; in France they have attempted it by the same means, but have unfortunately given the balance of power to the king. In this State we formerly sought it, by basing one House on valuation, and by representing townships rather than population in the other. Vermont, which is the most truly democratic in her legislation, composes her legislature entirely of delegates from townships or corporations. Each township is a distinct part, and is represented in the government, without any reference to the number of its inhabitants. The small township has the same representation with the large. This is a wise regulation, and Vermont is much indebted to it for the liberal character of her legislation, and the free and independent spirit of her inhabitants. She is never subjected to the sway of the absolute majority, but even in her ordinary legislation collects the sense of her community through its parts. The particular manner of organizing the State, so as always, to have the concurrence of the parts as a check upon the absolute numerical majority, must be left to the particular State, to be determined according to its already existing natural or artificial divisions. In some States it may be done by regarding territorial divisions, in others, perhaps, by making valuation instead of population the basis ; in some by taking the concurring majorities only in forming the constitution, and in others by representing these in one House and the numerical majority in the other. The precise manner of getting at it is the question for the practical statesmen of the community it concerns. All we can add is, that without some contrivance of the sort, a wise administration of government, and its beneficial working will be a matter of accident, never to be counted on with any degree of certainty.

In passing, we may remark, as it concerns our own Commonwealth, the tendency has been in an opposite direction. Our Senate was formerly based on valuation ; we have now based it on population ; our House of Representatives was formerly based on corporations, (townships) ; but we are every year approaching near-

er and nearer to population, and have already come so near, that Boston and three or four other large towns control the whole legislature. This tendency has been looked upon as democratic. Perhaps it were well to inquire, if it has rendered legislation more favorable to the rights of individuals, and afforded additional protection to minorities. Many things are thought to be democratic, against which a wise statesman will set his face. It is not democracy we want, but good government, a government which secures to each individual, by effective guaranties, the free and full enjoyment of all his natural rights. These guaranties, which are the substance, may be lost, while we are in pursuit of abstractions, and theoretic unity, which are often but mere shadows. All good government is founded in compromise, and is more or less complicated. To simplify it is nothing else but to render it absolute. If we simplify so as to render all consistent with the popular idea of democracy, we only bring individuals and minorities under the absolute sway of the majority. If we simplify in favor of aristocracy, it is to subject the many to the absolute supremacy of the few. If in favor of monarchy, it is to reduce all under the dominion of one. We must take care not to simplify till we simplify away all our rights, all that government is instituted to protect.

The right organization of the government, that is, such an organization of the commonwealth, of civil society, that the parts may always have a sort of suspensive veto on the whole, when its action becomes oppressive to any part, or goes beyond its constitutional limits, we hold to be the first object to be aimed at by the reformer as well as by the statesman. The first thing is to get a good government. This is the greatest of all earthly blessings to any people. Till this be obtained, there is no security for individual freedom, and consequently none for individual or social progress. The germs, or rather the outlines of a good government, each State in our confederacy has already adopted. Some modifications in accordance with various localities, ways

of thinking, and pursuits, will give good governments, so far as concerns their organic forms, to all. This done, it will not be difficult to secure their wise and faithful administration, to make them in fact as well as in name, agents for protecting each individual in the free and full enjoyment of his entire individuality.

We have in this paper endeavored to give a practical direction to our remarks. We have heretofore speculated not a little, and presented the subject of social reform on its ideal side, which was not amiss. For the ideal has its place, and an important one too, more important than our countrymen usually give it. But the practical has also its place; and when we come to the matter of acting, the question is never, what is in the number of future possibilities, but what is possible now, men and things being as they are, and what they are? We must come down from the ideal to answer this question, and forego our ecstasies. We must take sober views, and be after all somewhat moderate in our demands.

We have also given the direction we have to our remarks, with the hope of drawing attention more directly to the importance and precise nature of constitutional government. Our countrymen are all attached to constitutional government, and so far very well; but they seem to us to be far from comprehending the real nature of constitutional government in general, and their own in particular. We would, if we could, provoke the discussion of constitutional questions. The popular text-books and interpretations of our existing constitutions are unworthy a people engrossed in political matters as we are. In this part of the country constitutional law is hardly recognised. We have been engaged in the discussion of merely local or temporary questions, or in attempting to define abstract democracy. We complain not of this; but we think it is time to sink our political attorneyism, and even our political metaphysics, in wise, liberal, and philosophical statesmanship.

In conclusion, we would say, that in appealing so directly as we do to government, and making it almost the sole agent through which we are to remedy social evils, we by no means forget religion, morality, or individual intelligence. No man can rate them higher than we do. We hold them absolutely indispensable. But they must not be imprisoned in the bosom of the individual. They must be brought out of the interior of man, and made to disclose the true end of all social institutions, and to contribute to their adoption. We would always write as the Christian and the moralist, as well as the statesman. But we would use Christianity and morality in organizing the state and shaping its measures, not less than in our private exhortations to individuals. The end disclosed by true religion, the one enjoined by morality, and that sought by the state, are one and the same ; to wit, the freedom and progress in virtue and happiness of every individual. Unless the state maintain freedom for the individual, religion and morality can do little besides solace him in his sufferings, and strengthen him for his trials. This is no doubt a high office, and never to be thought lightly of ; but the intelligence, purity, and loftiness of soul, religion and morality are fitted to quicken, should be directed to the establishment of such institutions, and the enactments of such laws, as shall always favor truth, justice, freedom, order, and well-being.

EDITOR.

ART. II. — *Essays*. By R. W. EMERSON. Boston : James Munroe & Co. 1841. 16mo. pp. 303.

IN this Journal for April last, we called attention to these Essays, and promised that we would take an early opportunity to speak of them more at large. The promise we then made, we proceed now to redeem. And yet we hardly know how to do it. The Essays

are good and significant, but exceedingly troublesome to reviewers, for whose especial ease and convenience they seem by no means to have been written. They contain no doctrine or system of doctrines, logically drawn out, and presented to the understanding of the reader. They consist of detached observations, independent propositions, distinct, enigmatical, oracular sayings, each of which is to be taken by itself, and judged of by its own merits. Consequently, it is impossible to reduce their teachings to a few general propositions, and to sum up their worth in a single sentence.

To most persons, who read these *Essays*, they will seem to be wanting in unity and coherence. They will always strike as beautiful, often as just, and sometimes as profound; but the reader will be puzzled to round their teachings into a whole, or to discover their practical bearing on life or thought. Yet they have unity and coherence, but of the transcendental sort. The author seems to us to have taken, as far as possible, his stand in the Eternal, above time and space, and tried to present things as they appear from that point of vision, — not in their relation to each other as seen in the world of the senses, but in their relation to the spectator, who views them from above the world of the senses.

This fact should be borne in mind. Mr. Emerson, to speak scientifically, is no philosopher. He is a philosopher neither in the order of his mind, nor in his method of investigation. He explains nothing, accounts for nothing, solves no intellectual problem, and affords no practical instruction. He proposes nothing of all this, and, therefore, is not to be censured for not doing it. He is to be regarded as a Seer, who rises into the regions of the Transcendental, and reports what he sees, and in the order in which he sees it. His worth can be determined, that is, the accuracy of his reports can be properly judged of, by none except those who rise to the same regions, and behold the universe from the same point of view.

Writers like Mr. Emerson are seldom to be consulted for clear, logical, systematic expositions of any subject

or doctrine, never for the purpose of taking them as teachers or guides in the formation of opinions ; but for the suggestions, the incentives to thought they furnish, and the life they kindle up within us. They are thought by some to be writers without any practical value for mankind ; but they have, in fact, a very high practical value ; only not of the every day sort, only not that of dogmatic teachers or scientific expositors. They present new aspects of things, or at least old familiar objects in new dresses, the various subjects of thought and inquiry in new relations, break up old associations, and excite to greater and fresher mental activity. After having read them, we cannot say that we are wiser or more learned than we were before ; we cannot say that we have become acquainted with any new facts in the history of man or of the universe, or that we have any new ideas in regard to the human soul or its Creator ; but we feel, that somehow or other new virtue has been imparted to us, that a change has come over us, and that we are no longer what we were, but greater and better.

These are not the only writers we need ; but they have their place, and one of high trust, and of no slight influence. Their influence is not sudden, noisy, obvious to all senses, but slow, silent, subtle, permanent, entering into and becoming an integrant part of the life of the age, sometimes of the ages. They live and exert a power over the souls of men, long after their names are forgotten, and their works have ceased to be read. They are never in vogue with the multitude, but they are admired in select circles, who inhale their spirit, and breathe it into other and larger circles, who in their turn breathe it into the souls of all men. Though they may seem to have no practical aim, and no reference to every-day life, they have in the end a most important practical bearing, and exert a controlling influence over even the business concerns of the world. Let no one, then, regard them as mere idle dreamers, as mere literary toys, with whose glitter we may amuse ourselves, but without significance for the world of reality. They appear always for good or evil, and their appearance usually marks an epoch.

Mr. Emerson's book is a sincere production. It could have been produced only in this community at the present moment, and only by a man who had been placed in the relations he has to society and the Church. Such a book could never have emanated from a man, who had not been bred a clergyman, nor from one, who, having been bred a clergyman, had not ceased to be one. We may also say, that it could have been produced by no man, who had not been bred in a creed, which he had found insufficient to meet the wants of his intellect and heart, and who had not, in some measure, deserted it, without having found another in all respects satisfactory. We may say again, he must have been bred a unitarian, and having found unitarianism defective in consequence of its materialism, have felt and yielded to the reaction of spiritualism, and yet not sufficiently to return to any of the standard forms of orthodoxy.

We would speak respectfully of unitarianism, as we would always of the dead. It had its mission, and it has, in the providence of God, done great good in our community. But unitarianism was not, strictly speaking, a religion, could not become a religion; and it is well known, that almost always persons brought up under its influence, desert it as soon as they become seriously impressed, and desirous of leading religious lives. Men never embraced unitarianism because they were pious, but because they would dispense with being pious. Unitarianism never spoke to the heart, to the soul; never waked any real enthusiasm, or called forth any religious energy of character. It is in its nature *unspiritual*, merely intellectual and material, a sort of baptized atheism. The same causes, at bottom, which produced deism and atheism in France, produced unitarianism in New England. If the American mind had been as consequent as the French, as bold to push a doctrine to its last results, and had the Church here been organized as it was in France, and been as oppressive, our unitarians would have been avowed deists or atheists. We can find no more to feed our piety in the

"*Statement of Reasons*," than in the "*Système de la Nature*." Indeed, the author of the latter seems the more pious worshipper of the two, and betrays altogether more of peculiar religious emotion; and reverence is more readily yielded to d'Holbach's Nature than to Norton's Divinity. The one is living, plastic, active; the other is a stern, old mechanic, placed on the outside of nature, and troubling himself rarely with its operations; wrapping himself in night and silence, neither seen nor needed by men, and would be unconceived of, did he not charitably send us now and then a messenger to inform us that he really is, and no fiction, — a piece of information altogether gratuitous, as it serves no useful purpose in either the economy of nature or of salvation. With this "*Statement of Reasons*," unitarianism died, and there are few mourners to go about the streets, albeit there is for it no resurrection.

The old forms of faith had ceased to satisfy the minds of the generation preceding us. Calvinism could not be explained on the principles of Locke's philosophy, and the asceticism which puritanism had enjoined could not but be distasteful and offensive to the growing aristocracy of a prosperous country. Men politely educated, sumptuously clad, fond of good eating and drinking, full of hilarity and mirth, feeling in themselves an exuberance of life, and finding the world very well adapted to their tastes, and being, therefore, in no hurry to exchange it for another, were ill prepared to embrace the ascetic doctrines and practices of their stern old fathers, who never suffered their rigid features to relax with a smile, who thought to please God only by marring the beauty of his works, and by trampling under foot the choicest of his blessings. We do not blame them much. These old puritans are a very unpoetic race of beings, and neither so pious nor so ascetic, so ungiven to the flesh withal, as their admirers would fain have us believe, as may be learned by whomsoever will take the trouble to consult our old church records. They were a strong race, and able to do much; but they attempted altogether more than they could do. They under-

took to demolish both the flesh and the devil, and to live on earth as they expected to live in heaven ; that is, in surly communion with their own thoughts, and in singing psalms, with no better accompaniment than a jewsharp. Peace to their ashes. They were not without their mission, and have left their track on the ages. Perhaps, with less sourness, surliness, less rigidity, and with more of the amiable, the gentle, the attractive, they could not have done their work.

But the asceticism, which our puritan fathers insisted on, can be really practised by a people only while in the wilderness ; while poor, exposed to a thousand hardships, and finding earth no resting place, but a weary land, from which any deliverance may be accounted a blessing. In proportion as the wilderness is peopled, the barren waste converted into the fruitful garden, as grow the ornamental shrubs, and blossoms the rose, and delights are multiplied around us, we take more cheerful views of the world, and of life, and seek not to mortify ourselves, but to enjoy. Asceticism must, then, give way in practice, if not in theory. It did give way in practice, and for years all New England presented the spectacle of a people professing one faith, and living according to another. Some saw this, and being honest, were shocked at it. These became unitarians. Unitarianism was with us a protest against asceticism, even more than against the absurdity of Calvinism, as contemplated from the point of view of the Lockian philosophy. It was an effort of those who could not live in a perpetual lie, to reconcile their theology and their religion to their philosophy and their mode of living.

For a time it could do very well ; and as long as controversy could be maintained with opposing sects, it could apparently sustain some degree of intellectual life ; but no longer. As soon as the orthodox ceased to controvert, threw it back on itself, left it to its own resources, it ceased to live.

Inasmuch as it was a dissent from the popular faith, unitarianism appealed to freedom of thought and inquiry. It asserted the rights of the individual reason.

They who became unitarians, then, were not bound to continue such. They had a right to examine unitarianism, as well as the doctrines opposed to it. Such, again, was its own intrinsic deficiency, its utter inadequacy, as a religion, that the moment its own friends began to investigate it, they found they had outgrown it. They found elements in their nature it did not and could not accept, wants it did not and could not meet. They revolted against its materialism, its dryness, coldness, deadness. They fell back on the religious element of their natures, and sought refuge in a more spiritual philosophy. In this state of transition from materialism to spiritualism, from unitarianism to a modified orthodoxy, if we may be allowed the expression, our unitarian community now is. This transition is represented, in certain of its phases, in the book before us. It marks a movement of the unitarian mind towards a higher, a broader, a more truly religious faith and life. In this consists its significance, and if our orthodox friends were aware of this, they would read it with avidity and profit by it.

This revolt against materialism, and this return towards spiritualism, we regard as among the chief glories of our epoch, as a proof that the reign of infidelity is well nigh over, and that we are preparing a religious future. In this point of view, the men among us who represent this movement, and are for the present condemned, in no measured terms, as was to be expected, by both unitarians and the representatives of the old trinitarian asceticism, the old Calvinistic spiritualism, are the real benefactors of their age and country; the men, who, instead of abuse and discouragement, deserve honor and coöperation. But we never recognise our redeemers till we have crucified them. We cannot say of a truth, that they are sons of God, till we perceive the darkness which comes over the earth as they leave it.

These Essays mark among us the reaction of spiritualism. This constitutes their historical value. How far they represent truly the spiritualism that should be-

come dominant, is another question, and one which can be answered only by determining their positive value. This last can be done only by entering into a critical examination of their merits, a thing which it seems to us almost sacrilegious to attempt. They do not seem to us legitimate subjects of criticism. There is a sacredness about them, a mystic divinity, a voice issuing from them, saying to critics, "Procul, O procul, este, profani." To do them justice, they should be read with reverence, with a yielding spirit, an open heart, ready to receive with thankfulness whatever meets its wants or can be appropriated to its use. The rest, what is not congenial, should be left with pious respect; perhaps there are souls which will find it wholesome food. Why should we deprive others of appropriate nutriment, because it is no nutriment to us?

But Mr. Emerson sometimes descends from the Seer, and assumes the Reasoner. He sometimes touches on dogmas and systems, and if he adopts rarely a philosophical form, a system of philosophy lies back of his poetic utterances, and constitutes even for him the ground on which they are to be legitimated. This system we may examine without profanity. It will, moreover, be ultimately drawn out and formally taught by his disciples. His book will give it currency, and be appealed to as its authority. There can, then, be no impropriety in asking if it be true or false, complete or incomplete.

This system, we say distinctly, is not scientifically taught in the book before us. We are not sure that Mr. Emerson himself is always conscious of it. We are inclined to believe, that he thinks that he eschews all systems, and entangles himself in the meshes of no theory. But every man who speaks at all implies a theory, and in general the greatest theorizers are those who profess to abjure all theory. Every man has his own point of view, from which he contemplates the universe, and whence all his reports are drawn. The question may, then, always come up, is this the true point of view, the point from which the universe may be seen

as it really is, and represented in all its unity and diversity? The moment this question is asked, and we undertake to answer it, we plunge into metaphysics, and avail ourselves of system, of theory.

Mr. Emerson's point of view is, we have said, the transcendental. Can the universe, seen from this point of view alone, be truly represented? The answer to this question will enable us to determine the philosophic value of his *Essays*.

In the philosophy against which there is, in our times, a decided movement, there is no recognition of a transcendental world, of aught that transcends time and space. Immensity is merely space that cannot be measured; eternity is merely time without end. God, as well as man, exists in time and space, and differs from man only in the fact that he fills all space, and continues through all time. Eternal life is a life in time, but merely time endlessly continued. This philosophy never, therefore, carries us out of time and space. To all persons embracing this philosophy, transcendentalists must appear mere dreamers, endeavoring to give to airy nothing; a local habitation and a name.

Now, transcendentalism recognises a world lying back of and above the world of time and space. Time and space belong merely to the world of the senses; but the reason, — not as the principle of logic, but as the principle of intelligence, — rises immediately into a region where there is no time, no space. Immensity is not space infinitely extended, but the negation of all space; eternity is not time endlessly continued, but the negation of all time. God does not exist in space. We cannot say that he is here, there, somewhere, but that he is everywhere, which is only saying again, in other words, that he is nowhere. He exists not in, but out of time. We cannot say God was, God will be, but simply that he *is*, as the Hebrew name of God, *I AM*, plainly implies. To him there is no time. He has no past, no future. He inhabiteth eternity, dwells not in time, but in no-time, as Watts implies, when he says, with God "all is one eternal now."

All our ideas of truth, justice, love, beauty, goodness, are transcendental. Truth is truth, independent of time and place. The just is the just at one epoch, in one country, as much as in another. The beautiful never varies ; its laws, we all say, are eternal. Goodness is ever the same. The great principles of the Christian religion inhabit eternity. Hence Jesus says, "before Abraham was I am," and hence he is called "the Lamb slain from the foundations of the world," meaning thereby, that the principles of truth and duty he represented, and by which alone man can come into harmony with his Maker, were no principles of modern creation, but principles existing in the very Principle of things, — principles that have no dependence on time and space, but were in the beginning with God, and were God.

These remarks will help us to understand what is meant by transcendentalism. Transcendentalism, in its good sense, as used in our community, means the recognition of an order of existences, which transcend time and space, and are in no sense dependent on them, or affected by them. Transcendental means very nearly what our old writers, in Shakspeare's time, meant by the word *metaphysical*, from *μετα*, *beyond*, and *φύσικος*, *physical*, natural, belonging to the outward, visible, material world. Transcendentalists recognise a world lying beyond or above the world of the senses, and in man the power of seeing or knowing this transcendental world immediately, by direct cognition, or intuition.

All persons, who believe in God, in the reality of a spiritual world, and contend that their belief has any legitimate basis, are transcendentalists. Whoever is not a transcendentalist, must, if consequent, needs be a skeptic, or a materialist and an atheist. The early Christian fathers were transcendentalists, so were the distinguished English writers of the seventeenth century ; so were Descartes, Malebranche, George Fox, William Penn, and our own Edwards ; so were Price, and to a feeble extent, the Scottish School ; so are

nearly all the Germans, and the French Eclectics. Locke and his followers were not, nor were Condillac and the old French school. In fact, all real faith implies the Transcendental, and religion is an idle dream unless we admit the reality of an order of existences, a spiritual world transcending this outward, material, sensible world ; and also unless we admit in man the means of attaining legitimately to faith in that reality.

Mr. Emerson, by taking his stand in this transcendental region, evidently asserts its existence, and our power to take cognizance of it. So far his philosophy is eminently religious, and as we have demonstrated over and over again in the pages of this Journal, as well as elsewhere, is sound, and worthy of all acceptance. In this consists his chief philosophical merit. In this too consists his departure from Locke and the unitarian school proper, and his approach to orthodoxy. Thus far we go with him heart and hand, and recognise him as a fellow-laborer in that school of which we profess to be a disciple, though it may be an unworthy one.

But the transcendental, or, if you please, metaphysical, or spiritual world, exists not for the senses, nor can it be inferred from data furnished by the senses. It exists only for the reason. It is ideal, as opposed to sensible, spiritual as opposed to material, but real and substantial. Its existence is indeed involved in all the perceptions of the senses, and asserted in every thought and affirmation ; but we rise to the cognition of it only by means of reason, taken, as we have said, not as the principle of logic, but as the principle of intelligence.

Now, by taking our stand on the reason as the principle of intelligence, which is partly analogous to what Mr. Emerson calls the "Over-Soul," and attending exclusively to what it reveals, we are in danger of losing sight of the world of the senses, and therefore of suffering one aspect of the universe to escape us. The moment we rise into the world of reason, we find it altogether richer, sublimer, more beautiful, than this outward visible world. This outward visible world

gradually loses its charms for us, disappears from the horizon of our vision, and is therefore very naturally denied to have any existence. We thus fall into Idealism.

Again; the world of the senses is manifold and diverse, while the world of the reason is one and identical. In the transcendental world we rise to the principles of things. The principle of a thing is after all, in a certain sense, the thing itself. All principles proceed from and centre in one common principle, the principle of all things, — God. The diversity noted by the senses is then no real diversity, but merely phenomenal and illusory, and deserving no account from him who has risen to the perception of absolute unity, into which all is resolved at last. Diversity is therefore rejected, denied. The distinction between cause and effect ceases then to be intelligible; all difference between God and the universe to be perceptible. The universe is identical with God. God and the universe are one and the same; this is Pantheism.

Whoever then takes his stand exclusively in the Transcendental must fall into ideal Pantheism. From the transcendental point of view alone, a correct report of the universe cannot be made out, any more than from the point of view of the senses alone.

Now Mr. Emerson seems to us to verify in his own case the truth of this deduction. He falls in his philosophy, so far as philosophy he has, into ideal Pantheism. He is so charmed with the world of ideas, that he contemns the sensible, so struck with the unity and identity revealed by the reason, that he is led to overlook and occasionally to deny the manifold and the diverse, revealed by the senses. We cannot read a page of these *Essays* without perceiving that the tendency of his mind is to seek unity and identity. He brings together in the same sentence perpetually persons and things, events and transactions, apparently the most diverse, by a law of association which most readers are unable to discover, and the point of resemblance between which very few are able to perceive. Yet is he

in general just. The resemblance, the identity he asserts is there. His power of detecting the identical in the diverse, the analogous in the dissimilar, the uniform in the manifold, the permanent in the transitory, is remarkable, and unsurpassed in any writer of our acquaintance. He is ever surprising us by unexpected resemblances. To him all things are the same. In all this he is right. He uttered a great truth when he declared the identity of the power by which Lazarus was raised from the dead, and that by which falls the rain or blows the clover; also when he so shocked some of our pious people by declaring the identity of gravitation and purity of heart. This identity does run through all nature, and he has no true insight into the universe who cannot detect it.

But diversity, dissimilarity, multiplicity, are no less obvious and real in the universe than unity and identity. They have their origin too in the same source. God, the cause and principle of the universe, is not a mere unity, but a unity that has in itself the principle of multiplicity, — not pure identity, but at once identity and diversity, — a fact shadowed forth in the doctrine of a Triune God, which runs through all religious philosophies ever promulgated. Whoever overlooks this fact must fall into Pantheism. Mr. Emerson has a tendency to overlook it; and his disciples, for disciples always exaggerate the tendencies of their masters, will most assuredly overlook it. Some of them even now avow themselves Pantheists, and most of the young men and maidens who listened with so much delight to these *Essays* when they were delivered as lectures, virtually run into Pantheism, whether they know it or not.

The outward visible world is not the only world into which we are admitted, but it is a real world; that is, it really exists, and is no more an illusion than the world of reason; and the idealist is as exclusive and as erroneous as the materialist. The one denies the Transcendental, the other the Sensible. Both are wrong in what they deny, both are right in what they assert; and this fact, it strikes us, does not lie at the basis of Mr. Em-

erson's philosophy. Hence the wrong tendency of his speculations.

We are not prone to be frightened or shocked at mere words. Thank Heaven, we have strong nerves, and can bear much ; but we regard Pantheism as an error of no less magnitude than Atheism itself, and consequently must earnestly protest against every tendency to it. God and the universe are in the most intimate relation, but that relation is one of cause and effect, not of identity ; and while we admit that there is this identity running through all nature, to which Mr. Emerson points us, we also contend that there is a corresponding diversity to which he does not point us. We complain not of him for not doing this, but we note the fact in order to warn our readers against taking his utterances as complete expositions of the universe. He brings up one pole of truth, the one which has been too much depressed ; but in bringing up that he is not sufficiently heedful not to depress equally the other. We have revolted against exclusive materialism ; let us be careful not to fall now into exclusive spiritualism ; we have protested against Atheism and irreligion, or the forms of religion which were in fact no religion, and we should look to it that we do not now swallow up all diversity in unity, and man and the universe in God. The latter error would turn out to be as fatal to piety and morals as the former.

But after all, we have no serious apprehensions on this score. Ideal Pantheism, though a fatal error, is not one into which our countrymen are likely to fall, at least to any great extent. Only a few of the cultivated, the refined, the speculative, the idle, and contemplative, are exposed to it. Men in active business, taking their part in the rough and tumble of life, coming in daily contact with one another in the market, the hustings, the legislative halls, scrambling for power or place, wealth or distinction, have little leisure, less inclination, and still less aptitude for that order of thought which ends in the denial of matter, and of the universe as distinguished from its Creator. The cast of their minds

is too practical, and they are of too sturdy, too robust a make to find anything satisfactory in so refined a spiritualism. Their daily habits and pursuits demand a solid earth on which to work, a providence to protect them, a sovereign to rule over them, a real God to curb their headstrong violence, and to reduce them to order and peace, to chastise them for their errors, and to solace them in their afflictions. The practical tendencies of our countrymen will save them from all danger they would be likely to incur from speculative refinements like those we have pointed out; and we are not sure but Mr. Emerson's strong statements are needed to rectify their over-attachment to the material order.

As it concerns the ethical doctrines implied rather than set forth in these *Essays*, we have nothing to add to the remarks we have heretofore made on the same subject.* Mr. Emerson's moral philosophy, reduced to its systematic element, belongs to the egoistical school; but we presume, after all, that he means little more by those expressions which imply it, and which have given so much offence, than that just self-reliance, that fidelity to one's own nature and conscience, without which it is impossible to reach or maintain a true manly worth. In this view of the case, his *Essay on Self-Reliance* is a noble and unexceptionable performance, and inculcates a lesson, which it were well for us all to learn and practise, — a lesson which is perhaps more appropriate to the American people than to any other Christian nation, for no other Christian nation is so timid in its speculations, so afraid of solving for itself, independently, the problem of the destiny of man and society. We regard it as decidedly one of the best *Essays* in the collection.

We did intend to quote largely from the book itself, in order to justify our criticisms, but it is not a book from which quotations can be made with much satis-

* Boston Quarterly Review, No. iv. Oct. 1838. Article, *Emerson's Address*.

faction. We could not select a paragraph that would not at once confirm and refute our general criticisms. We content ourselves, therefore, with speaking merely of its dominant tendency, as it appears to us. The book cannot be judged of without being read, and the best way to read it, will be to forget its metaphysics, and to take it up as we would a collection of poems, or of proverbs.

Of the *Essays* we cannot speak particularly. The one on Heroism is inferior to what we expected from its author, and falls far below the general average of the book. Those on Love and Friendship are beautiful and often true, but their truth and beauty proceed from the intellect and imagination rather than the heart and soul. They read not like the confessions of a lover or a friend. There are depths in the affections, into which the author does not descend, deeper experiences than any he discloses. The *Essays* we have liked the best are those on the Over-Soul, Self-Reliance, and History.

These *Essays* are, to a certain extent, democratic; they condemn all ordinary aristocracies, and breathe much respect for labor and the laborer; but it is evident, at a single glance, that the author is at best only an amateur workingman, one who has never himself wielded spade or mattock to any great extent, and who has viewed labor with the eye of a poet, rather than with the feelings of an actual laborer. His book, though apparently radical, contains nothing more likely to give offence to the capitalist than to the proletariat.

One of the most serious objections, we have to urge against these *Essays*, is the little importance they assign to the state, and the low rank they allow to patriotism as a virtue. This is an error of our transcendental school generally, and results, we suppose, chiefly from the fact, that its principal masters are or have been churchmen, and, therefore, not over and above acquainted with practical life. Their studies lead them to rely on preaching, persuasion, advice, appeals to the reason and conscience. Their habits and position remove them

from the actual world, and its necessities, and keep them ignorant of no small part of the actual developments of human nature. Clergymen are usually able to give wholesome advice, at least, advice which will generally be regarded as canonical ; but they are rarely gifted with much practical skill or sagacity. A deliberative assembly, composed entirely of clergymen, is usually a very disorderly body, and ill adapted to the speedy despatch of business. The members are all so enlightened, so wise, so good, so meek, and so conscientious, that ordinary parliamentary rules are rarely thought to be necessary ; and the result is not seldom confusion, angry, disorderly debate, and no little ill feeling and ill speaking. This anti-political tendency of our transcendentalists is, therefore, easily accounted for. Nevertheless, it is a false tendency. Man, as we have endeavored to prove in a foregoing article, is to be perfected in society, and society is to be perfected by government. More, than even politicians themselves usually imagine, depends on the right organization of the commonwealth. The science of politics, when rightly viewed, is a grand and an essential science, and needs always to be held in honor. Much is lost by not making it a subject of more serious study. Everybody talks about politics, and yet there is scarcely a man among us acquainted with the simplest principles of politics, regarded as a science. The proper organization of the state, the true exposition of the constitution, and the proper administration, so as to secure the true end of government, are matters with which we, as a people, rarely trouble ourselves ; and scarcely a man can be found, who can speak on them five minutes in succession, without betraying gross ignorance, both theoretical and practical. In this state of political science, our scholars are doing us great disservice by sneering at politics and the state.

As mere literary productions, these *Essays* must take rank with the best in the language. There is now and then an affectation of quaintness, a puerile conceit, not precisely to our taste, but it detracts not much from

The following is a summary of the results of the study. The first part of the study was a literature review. The second part was a survey of the attitudes of the students. The third part was a survey of the attitudes of the teachers. The fourth part was a survey of the attitudes of the parents. The fifth part was a survey of the attitudes of the community. The sixth part was a survey of the attitudes of the government. The seventh part was a survey of the attitudes of the media. The eighth part was a survey of the attitudes of the religious community. The ninth part was a survey of the attitudes of the business community. The tenth part was a survey of the attitudes of the academic community. The eleventh part was a survey of the attitudes of the political community. The twelfth part was a survey of the attitudes of the cultural community. The thirteenth part was a survey of the attitudes of the sports community. 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1871. — The Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 1.

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*"...the world's largest source of energy production. But the
"role of the Gulf in the development of nations."*

I say, labor for God ; but, if I mistake not, people have somewhat vague notions about laboring for God. Formerly, to labor for God meant building him temples, performing the temple-service, endowing religious establishments, and sustaining and obeying the priesthood. But our obligation to labor for God, in this sense, is not quite self-evident. God stands in no great need of our assistance. He does not ask us to build him a house to dwell in, nor to provide him food and raiment ; for he dwelleth not in houses made with men's hands, nor is he served with men's hands, as though he needed anything.

To labor for God, to serve God, is to engage with him, and labor to accomplish his divine purposes. We labor for him, when we work to the same end to which he works. He is a living power, and active energy, always working. The end to which he works is the production of goodness. He is Love, and his energy is ever the energy of love. In all he does he is diffusing himself, communicating his own divinity. Consequently, whenever we labor at the command of love, to diffuse goodness, to promote the good of God's empire, the good of the universe of being, we may with strict propriety be said to labor for God, to serve God. "Lord," say the righteous, "when saw we thee an hungered and fed thee, naked and clothed thee, sick and in prison and ministered unto thee?" "Inasmuch as ye did it unto the least of these, my brethren, ye did it unto me."

This is the great principle, of which we should never lose sight. We serve God by serving his children, by doing good to whom he does good. God is goodness ; we serve him, therefore, when we serve the cause of goodness. God is love ; we serve him, then, when we labor to enlarge, fix, and consolidate the empire of love. God is perfection ; we labor for him, then, when we labor to perfect either ourselves or others.

I must be allowed to dwell on this point a moment ; for, in most people's minds, serving God is a mysterious matter. To say the least, all is loose and vague. When the preacher exhorts them to serve God, they imme-

diately fancy that there is some mysterious or arbitrary duty for them to perform, for the performance of which no good reason can be assigned, save that God enjoins it, and will damn them if they neglect it. Their minds turn at once to some ecclesiastical work, to a religious profession to be made, a ritual to be observed, or a discipline to be undergone. Why the work implied should be done, they cannot guess ; why God should love them for doing it they cannot imagine ; unwilling to act without a reason, and unable to find one, they generally end in doing nothing ; at least, nothing to the purpose. Now, the interpretation I give to laboring for God relieves them from these embarrassments, and presents them a plain, distinct, tangible work, which carries its obligation with itself. I need no evidence to convince me, that I ought to labor to promote the well-being of God's children, to diffuse truth, righteousness, love, joy, peace. There is that within me which supersedes the necessity of proof. The proof is immediate, irresistible, and universal. I may ask, What is love, truth, goodness? Never, — Ought I to labor for their promotion?

We can, in this view of the case, see our work, and know when we are doing it. It is a work growing out of the nature God has given us, out of the constitution of his empire ; not a mere ritual, which the priests make or may unmake. The whole is summed up in a word ; we are to seek spiritual perfection, to serve God, and show forth our fear of the Lord, by serving his children, by doing good to whom God does good.

This is the only way in which we can reach God. No man hath seen him at any time, and no man can see him ; but we may behold his glory in the face of his Son. The Word was in the beginning, it was with God, it was God, God all entire ; but became an object of knowledge, of love and worship, not till made flesh, manifested in a human form, dwelling among us, full of grace and truth. We worship the invisible in the visible, the Creator in the creature, the Father in the Son. No man who hates his brother, loves God, and no man,

who serves not his brother, can serve God, however punctual he may be in his observance of the forms of religion and piety.

God is not a mere abstraction; a speculative entity, but a practical nullity. He is absolute; the living reality, on which all beings depend for their existence, in whose bosom they are, and without whom they were not. But this statement does not meet the wants of the soul. Viewed simply as the ground of all being, the essence, substance of all life, the fountain whence streams the universe, he is to us merely fate, necessity, dark, inscrutable, overwhelming. It is only in his Word, his Utterance, Manifestation, that he is an object of love and adoration. I see his glory only as it shines in his works, or in the face of his Son. To my reason there is God the Father, the ground of all being, the fountain of all life, the creator and upholder of the universe; but to my heart there is no God, but "God manifest in the flesh." God, as he speaks to me in all sweet and thrilling voices, God that comes to me in all pure and gentle influences, that breathes freshness and power into my soul, in friendship and love. The God I worship must be embodied, must speak to me in a real voice, and show himself to me in a living form. Every embodiment of the true, the beautiful, the lovely, the good, is to me a shrine of the true God, at which I joyfully offer my heart's incense.

I hear much said about loving this or that quality, of separating, as it were, the attribute from the subject, and of loving the attribute only. But we never love the abstract. The abstract exists not for the heart. It is not goodness that we reverence, but him who is good; it is not beauty that we love, but the being who is beautiful. The heart never abstracts; it concretes; and discards the quality whenever it fails to embody it. The affections all clothe their objects with life and form, weave them, as it were, a garment of flesh. This, if I mistake not, is the secret of the sublime mystery of our religion, "God manifest in the flesh," the "mystery of godliness," which removes it so far from a

mere system of ethics. God shines upon us from all that is bright and lovely, speaks to us from all that is true and holy, lives to us in all that is living. I see him in the sun and stars, in the green blade and opening flower ; I inhale him in the sweet breath and balmy fragrance of spring ; I love him in the face and heart of my friend. All the true, the beautiful, the good, who speak to my soul, and entwine themselves with my affections, speak to me of God, are manifestations, and the brightest manifestations of the Godhead. Man is the Shekinah of God. It is not strange, then, that they who denied the divinity of the Son, should have been regarded by the Church as the virtual deniers of the Father. They do deny the Father, so far forth as he exists as an object of worship.

The error of the Church has been in not generalizing the truth she has contended for, in separating one visible manifestation of the Divinity from all connexion with others, who differ from that one only as one star differs from another in glory. The Church has contended for a general truth, a truth of all times, and of all worlds ; but she has regarded it as a special truth, a truth in relation to one individual only. By this she has shorn it of its glory, almost lost sight of it, and entirely concealed it from the great mass of mankind. Nevertheless, she has held fast to it, and that is her praise. She will one day comprehend it better, and then we shall not be called upon to seek the living among the dead.

Our Protestant churches have misconceived this truth to an altogether greater extent than the Catholic church has done. They have driven the Divinity out of his works, and placed him beyond the reach of the heart, almost beyond the reach of the reason itself. But the Catholic church, in permitting the invocation of saints, and the worship of the Virgin, blest mother of God, has recognised and given it, consciously or unconsciously, her sanction. We have done great disservice to religion by dethroning the saints, those brilliant forms, which symbolized to our hearts the beauty of holiness ; and in denying the divinity of the Virgin, did we but know it,

we have robbed the Godhead of all its sweetness, the universe of its living, loving heart, and given as an object of worship, only a stern, frowning, forbidding Majesty, before whom we cannot stand, and from whose presence we shrink with awe and terror. Our advance on Catholicism has, in too many respects, been a retrograde movement towards Judaism, a substitution of the Jewish Jehovah, with his stern and awful grandeur, for the mild and beneficent Creator revealed by Jesus. If, in any other respect, we have advanced, it has been in satisfying the demands of logic at the expense of the heart.

But to return. To fear God, I have said, is to stand in awe of his majesty, to reverence his wisdom, to love his goodness, and obey his will. This, practically, resolves itself into awe, love, reverence of and obedience to moral rectitude. They who stand in awe of the right, who are governed by a strict regard to it, who are always moved by pure and holy feeling, and exert themselves continually, with the whole energy of their being, to establish, extend, and consolidate the empire of righteousness, truth, love, peace, in their own souls and among their fellow-men, and who would shrink from the bare thought of doing otherwise, are those who, in a scriptural sense, may be said to fear the Lord, and in the language of my text, "the secret of the Lord is with them, and he will show unto them his covenant."

The secret of the Lord is with them that fear him; that is, they who love, and reverence moral goodness, and labor diligently and conscientiously for its diffusion, know God, even the secret things of God. "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God." This means more than that God will reward the pure in heart for being pure, or that the pure in heart shall see and know God hereafter. There is a necessary connexion between purity of heart and seeing or knowing God. The pure heart as naturally takes cognizance of God, as the healthy eye, of shapes or colors.

This may seem a rash statement, but it is true. To

see God, either in this world or the next, cannot be to see a visible shape, or bodily presence. Unquestionably, as I have contended, God to be seen and worshipped must needs be manifested, concreted in some form perceptible to the heart; but he himself has no more form or bodily configuration than the human soul, or to take a stronger case, than a thought or a feeling. The Jews were, therefore, forbidden to make of him any graven image, or to undertake to represent him by any likeness which could be produced by the chisel or the pencil. They might as well attempt to bring out of the marble or the canvass an image, not of the lightning, as it appears to our senses, but of its occult power or force, as an image or likeness of God. God has no form, or shape visible to the outward eye. He is in all forms and all shapes, but is none of them.

But God is nevertheless visible to the spiritual eye, and may be as positively known as any object of knowledge whatever. Thought has no form or shape, but what is more cognizable? You know your own thoughts, take them as objects of new thoughts, and make them the subject-matter of discourse. You, at this moment take cognizance of my thoughts. My thoughts are now passing from my mind to yours. You perceive them with none of your outward senses; nevertheless, you take note of them, converse with them, and are now comparing them with your own, in order to ascertain their worth.

You cannot see love, and yet you may know it, and recognise it as readily as you do your friend's face. Moreover, that which you love in your friend, is not that which your outward senses take cognizance of. One may say in sober truth, that no man ever saw his friend. Friendship belongs to the soul, and can no more be seen than the soul itself. Outwardly love cannot be seen, but whoso has ever loved knows it, and recognises its voice. Only they who have never loved are ignorant of love. So of truth, justice, goodness. We possess good feelings, we delight in certain feel-

ings, are averse to certain other feelings. The soul knows its own feelings, yet these have no outward, visible shape. The outward, visible shape then is not essential.

The way in which the soul knows a thought, feeling, or sentiment, is by possessing. It knows thought by thinking, love by loving. Two lovers understand one another, because there is but one spirit between them. Love is the same in them both. The soul of one, so far as love is concerned, knows what the soul of the other knows, because it is identical with it. Could we assume two individuals between whom the likeness should be complete, both intellectually and morally, we should find that one would know precisely what the other would. All that any man wants, in order to know all that another knows, is an entire sympathy with him.

In this same way we know God. God is love. We know love by loving, and know it to the full extent to which our love is pure and perfected. To the full extent then to which our love is pure and perfected, do we know God. God is holiness. The soul knows holiness by being holy; just so far as it is holy it knows what holiness is, and just so far it knows God. So may we say of wisdom, truth, beauty, goodness. We know God by having his attributes developed within us. When they are developed within us, we know them by our own immediate consciousness, and know them just so far and no farther than they are so developed.

We know God by possessing him. The pure in heart possess him, and therefore know him. God dwells in the heart of every good man, and is his goodness. He that loveth dwelleth in God and God in him. The wicked know not God, and simply because being wicked, he does not dwell in them; there is no sympathy between him and them. God is love, holiness, truth. But to love, holiness, truth, the wicked are strangers. They have no inward experience of them, and cannot be made to know them. No one can know love who has not loved. No description, howev-

er striking or graphic, can convey to the soul, as yet untouched, any conception of it. But when you have once loved, once had the sentiment kindled up within you, when once your hearts have been drawn to, bound to, intertwined with, nay fused into the heart of another, you know what love is, and know too whether he who speaks of it, speaks from his own inward experience, or from imagination or mere hearsay. Who again that had never grieved, never wept over the loss of that which was to his heart dear, beautiful, and good, could understand by the swollen eye, sunken cheek, heaving breast, broken words, sobs and tears, that heart-rending tale they reveal to him, who is a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief? Other examples, innumerable, I might bring to prove that we know only by possessing, or, as our religious friends say, "by experience;" but it is unnecessary. As we know love, friendship, justice, holiness, sorrow, grief, by possessing them, and only by possessing them, so know we God by possessing him, and only by possessing him.

We are misled on this point, because we take for God, not the living spirit, but the dead letter, the lifeless words in which we have sought to embody our conceptions of him. These words perplex us. We find God everywhere, we see him in all that is living, hear him in all sounds, from the gentle whisper of the evening breeze to the loud-speaking thunder, feel him in all just sentiments and pure emotions; but we do not recognise him, do not own him to be God, unless we find him marked and labelled, as an antique in a cabinet of curiosities. We dare not say to ourselves that he is God, the true, the living God, unless beneath the picture on which we gaze, we find the priest, in a plain, round, sacerdotal hand, has so written. Many a poor man has gone through the world fancying himself an atheist, while all the time he was one of the devoutest of God's worshippers. Definitions deceive us. God is the Indefinable. He cannot be compressed within a form of words. Always will he leap the bounds we prescribe; always he surpasses the utmost limits of

thought. Let us then cease to seek him in words, or fancy, because we find him not in this or that form of words, we find him not at all. We should have more confidence in our own spiritual discernment, and dare believe that all that we see and know of truth, beauty, love, goodness, is so much of God. Look deep enough, and you will find God everywhere. Look deep enough, and you will see God at the bottom of every thought, of every emotion. He will shine out to you from all nature, sing to you from all voices, and speak to you from all pure and noble hearts.

The secret of the Lord is with them that fear him. They who fear the Lord are the pure in heart, the upright, the true, the self-denying, the disinterested, the heroic, who wed themselves to all that is pure and lovely, beautiful and good, and follow it through good report and through evil, in life and in death, time and eternity. They possess, in themselves, truth, beauty, holiness, love; and to possess these is to possess God. Whoso possesses these knows them, and, therefore, knows God. If he knows God, he knows his relation to God, the secret of God's covenant, what God demands of him, and what he will give him.

The great practical truth implied in all this is, that we know by sympathy, and by sympathy only. God is unknown only to those who have no sympathy with him. Whatever we would know we must first love. Nature keeps her secret from all who love her not. She throws aside her veil only to the soul that loves her. She is veiled to whomsoever would scan her features for the sake of pointing out their defects. Go forth with an open soul, a genial heart, and she will meet you with a like open soul and genial heart. Love is the key to her mysteries. To love all is open, penetrable, living, radiant, tuneful, loving. To the unloving all is silent, dead; nature is a charnel-house, cold, and damp. Whoso sympathizes with nature gains her heart. To him a new world opens; to him there is no solitude, no desert waste. Blest beings everywhere hover over him, come to him in the glad thoughts of

his waking, and the sweet visions of his sleeping. The spirits sing to him, angel voices everywhere greet him, soothe him, inspire him, wake the music of his own soul, and dissolve the universe in melody. Would we know God, nature, man, we must place ourselves in harmony with them, yield to their influences, and entwine our affections with theirs; we must grow into what we would know. We must be heroic to know the hero; we must throw off the artificial, and become one with nature to know nature; and to know God, we must, as it were, become God.

Knowledge and wickedness go not together. The truly intellectual man is always a great and a good man. Whoso has penetrated into the mysteries of the universe has done it only on the condition of placing himself in harmony with its laws, or, in other words, with the will of its Creator. He has in him an open soul, a loving heart, a genial sympathy, a nature which has an affinity for truth, beauty, and goodness. He is then a prophet, priest, king, a revealer of God, and a redeemer of men.

In seeking, then, to know God, do not begin by cavilling, do not begin with a dry, hard, dead, and deadening spirit. Be assured, that all you can ever know of God will be simply what you yourselves possess of him. Go neither into yourselves nor into nature with a critical, cavilling spirit, but with a broad, generous nature, ready to yield to whatever strikes your admiration or raises your wonder. Go with a hungry soul, that would take up into itself all it finds, that will let nothing that really is escape it. God will then reveal himself always and everywhere to your admiring, your reverential hearts.

Admitting this, I may conclude by saying, that as we know God by possessing him, and that possessing him is precisely the same with possessing moral goodness, truth, beauty, and excellence of soul, it follows, that the more we possess of these, that is, the more really excellent we become, the more do we possess and know of God, the deeper do we penetrate into his secret, the

more fully do we comprehend him. In order, then, to know God, which is life eternal, we are not to seek in books or in sermons for definitions, nor in metaphysics for theorems and demonstrations ; but to go forth and work, go forth and labor to *be* true, good, noble, disinterested, heroic.* You need not seek to name the Unnameable, to define the Undefinable ; you need not seek to construct theodicies, nor to torture language into hymns of fulsome praise ; but let your own souls be your systems of theology, and your lives hymns. Be ye perfect, and your perfection shall be a revelation of God, your thoughts shall be praise, your emotions worship, your sentiments grateful incense rising in perennial fragrance to the Universal Spirit. Fear God, obey him, and you will know him, and your knowledge shall be his praise, and his glory.

ART. IV. — *Democracy in America. Part Second. The Social Influence of Democracy.* By ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE. New-York: J. & H. G. Langley. 1840.*

HUME, in his History, reign of Charles the Second, while endeavoring to unravel the famous popish plot, thus remarks ; “ in one sense, there is a *popish plot* perpetually carrying on, against all states, Protestant, Pagan, and Mahometan.” If to this we add its just counterpart, that a Protestant or sectarian plot is everywhere in a like state of indefinite progression, the proposition may be safely assented to even in this late and enlightened age of the world. The fell spirits of intolerance, bigotry, and proselytism, have never revelled more generally or more actively than of late. Even during the

* The Editor of this Journal inserts this paper on Catholicism, from a highly esteemed friend, without endorsing it. It is, however, worthy of a careful study.

singular era of British *puritanism*, there was not a closer assumed relation between social interests and religion, than we may now perceive in the Propaganda of Rome, and the Missionary enterprises of the Protestant church. The jesuitical spirit is still, as for long ages past, a considerable element in ecclesiastical affairs; and because God and religion are unquestionable truths, nay more, are innate feelings or deep seated passions of the human soul, while individual men are desperately selfish, there is little hope of a speedy extinction of hypocrisy. The artfulness of a sinister few will too probably long continue to control the weak through the honest fanaticism of the many, and thus pervert the aggregate piety of the world to the basest purposes of power.

At this day, and even now, in the United States, there exists much alarm respecting the encroachment of sectarian tyranny. Sermons, and more systematic treatises, by the devotees of specific forms of faith in abuse of others, stream from our pulpits, and public press. "Awful disclosures," from sources at least as questionable as were those of Titus Oates and Bledsoe, are devoutly obtruded upon the American public. The stigma of infidelity is bandied about with unscrupulous ceremony; and, indeed, attempted to be fixed upon an entire political party, comprising half the population of the Union. Church edifices of every species, are multiplying beyond all precedent; are extremely gaudy and expensive; and their erection seems likely to become a peculiar *trade*, the profits of which are to arise from the sale of *pews* at extravagant prices. Clergymen of particularly persuasive or convincing powers, are greater men, and more liberally paid than ever before. In short, the general aspect of church matters is such, that we have but to believe in the sincerity and single purpose of their active champions, to hail the long desired arrival of the thousand millennial years. We admit, there is abundant occasion for all this noise and activity; not so much, however, to supply an extraordinary demand, as to conceal the self-developing weaknesses and defects of the system. For

certain it is, that a formal Catholic and a bigoted Protestant, or any two contrarious sectarians, are necessarily bound, as by an imperious law, to scowl at and quarrel with each other, thereby to prevent a mutual and fatal paroxysm of immoderate laughter.

But not to treat lightly of a subject, to which the long duration and intensity of its controversy, if nothing more, give serious importance, we will now proceed to investigate the *nature* of Catholicism, and endeavor to draw from thence its probable progress and final result.

The subject derives new interest from the bold, and, we think, superficial views advanced by De Tocqueville, in the second part of his work on American Democracy. He there unequivocally asserts, that *the* Catholic religion is rapidly advancing towards paramount ascendancy in the United States, and plainly associates its spirit with the generalizing disposition of our people. He observes ;

“ America is the most democratic country in the world, and it is at the same time, (according to reports worthy of belief,) the country in which the Roman Catholic religion makes most progress. At first sight, this is surprising.

“ Two things must here be accurately distinguished ; equality inclines men to wish to form their own opinions ; but, on the other hand, it imbues them with the taste and the idea of unity, simplicity, and impartiality in the power which governs society. Men living in democratic ages are, therefore, very prone to shake off all religious authority ; but if they consent to subject themselves to any authority of this kind, they choose, at least, that it should be single and uniform. Religious powers not radiating from a common centre, are naturally repugnant to their minds ; and they almost as readily conceive that there should be no religion, as that there should be several.

“ At the present time, more than in any preceding one, Roman Catholics are seen to lapse into infidelity, and Protestants to be converted to Roman Catholicism. If the Roman Catholic faith be considered within the pale of the Church, it would seem to be losing ground ; without that pale, to be gaining it. Nor is this circumstance difficult of explanation. The men of our days are naturally little disposed to believe ; but, as soon as they have any religion, they immediately find in themselves a latent propensity, which urges them unconsciously toward Catholicism. Many of the doctrines and the practices of the Romish Church astonish them ; but they feel a secret admiration for its discipline, and its great unity attracts them. If Catholicism could at length withdraw itself from the political ani-

mosities, to which it has given rise, I have hardly any doubt but that the same spirit of the age, which appears to be so opposed to it, would become so favorable as to admit of its great and sudden advancement.

"One of the most ordinary weaknesses of the human intellect is to seek to reconcile contrary principles, and to purchase peace at the expense of logic. Thus, there have ever been, and will ever be, men who, after having submitted some portion of their religious belief to the principle of authority, will seek to exempt several other parts of their faith from its influence, and to keep their minds floating at random between liberty and obedience. But I am inclined to believe, that the number of these thinkers will be less in democratic than in other ages; and that our posterity will tend more and more to a single division into two parts, some relinquishing Christianity entirely, and others returning to the bosom of the Church of Rome."

— Book I. Chap. vi.

An indistinct perception of the practical nature of our peculiar institutions, and, perhaps, a native prejudice in favor of the pomp and power, if not the principles of the Romish church, may sufficiently account for these opinions of De Tocqueville. His acute powers of observation convince him, that in the midst of the extreme "individualism," the isolated efforts at personal ascendancy in society, there is at the same time an active tendency among us towards a general assimilation of character and belief. Limited in the more enlarged operations of mind by the excessive powers of his strong perceptive faculties, he believes, because he perceives the verging of extreme individual liberty towards a common sameness of conduct and opinion in the United States, and having long observed, and been familiar with but one specific form of fully developed Catholicism, he hastily assumes, that its characteristic features will become impressed upon the spontaneous unity of the American religion. His is evidently not a mind to discriminate accurately between appearances and reality. It does not seem to have ever occurred to him, that Roman Catholicism is but *one* form of ecclesiastical tyranny; a form derived from the contingent circumstances and events, which accompanied its progress to maturity. The character, too, of the people among whom it commenced its career, and the progressive action and reaction, as agent and reagent, of that

church and that people upon each other, has resulted in just such a church and just such a population as we find at this day in the various sections of Europe. The same original influence, if now acting anew on so very different a popular material as these States present, would certainly result in a species of church having little apparent identity with the Romish, or any other known Catholicism. De Tocqueville's anticipations are, indeed, nearly as absurd as to suppose the possibility, that by spontaneous operations among ourselves, or by immigration of Mahometans, or the industry of any number of agents of the Mufti and Dervishes, the Koran would come to supersede the Bible, and the adoration of the Arab prophet obtain in this country. We are in very little more danger from the cowl than the turban, the crucifix than the crescent. If any Catholicism shall here become established, it must assume a form as peculiar as is the genius of the people, or at least be adapted to the general spirit of the age.

While mankind are regarded as a mere cluster of *isolated selves*, without any other communal element than obscure, and, of a sort, accidental similitude of bodies and minds, and, consequently, while artificial regulations and laws are deemed essential rather than simply convenient, it is certain that Catholicisms, more or less perfectly matured, will continue, and will be spurious, changeable, belligerent, and tyrannical. Before the Reformation, the Catholic religion of western Europe was Roman; of the eastern, Greek; and of western and southern Asia, Mahometan. Since that period, other Catholic religions have become established; particularly, one in England, and another in Scotland. Indeed, no civilized country can be said to be without its peculiar Catholicism. Even in the United States, theoretically free as is the opinion of the citizen, both by constitutions and laws, certain features of religious exclusiveness are plainly discernible; for example, the observance, in some places by law! of the first day of the week as a holy day, the customary use of formal prayer in connexion with our legislative proceedings,

and the appointment of specific days of fasting, and of thanksgiving, by many of our governors of States. These practices, as involving controverted points of faith, are, strictly speaking, incompatible with freedom of opinion and conduct, and contain the characteristic element of the old Catholicisms. The fashionable use of the persecuting denunciation of *infidelity*, — which is always that of *heresy* in disguise, — is also indicative of a disposition toward coercion in matters of religious faith. We may go further and safely assert, that a system of social reputation, based upon sectarian fellowship, and pecuniary contribution to a certain limited class of ascendant Churches, has been carefully nursed into great practical strength. In some localities, it is well for the business man, that he appears to be a zealous Unitarian; in others, a Presbyterian, and again, in others, a Baptist, or Methodist. Catholicism in America is, indeed, much enfeebled by a multiplied competition between its own disjointed members, but the thing itself is in the midst of us; not in distinct Roman or Protestant guise, but simply, a *conservative* Catholicism; willing, perhaps, to become either Roman or Protestant, if society will but sufficiently retrograde.

A low ebb of general popular intelligence, amounting to sheer simplicity, is requisite for that measure of prejudice and moral dependence, which can subject a whole nation to implicit belief. In such a state of general feebleness of mind, the whole world has, indeed, once been; hence the institution of corrupt Catholicism, which, by the force of habit, and the indirect insinuations of early education, has been perpetuated, with a waning power, however, to this our day. It is safe to assert, that had all such schemes of tyranny been deferred till now, they could take no firm root in any portion of the civilized world. The people of America and Europe are now become too intelligent for the quiet reception of prescribed opinions on any subject of moral contemplation. The first distinct development of awakened mind is, that it cannot think and believe by authority; that it has within itself the perception, or

the revelation of truths. Thus it is, that the "individualism," which De Tocqueville so clearly discerns in the United States; that strong confidence in self, or reliance upon one's own exertion and resources, is precisely the antipodal principle of a tyrannical Catholicism. The strife of all our citizens for wealth and distinction *of their own*, and their contempt of reflected honors, their easy familiarity with persons in authority, or of eminence, of which this observer has seen so much, disprove, most effectually, his Roman Catholic prophecy. Nevertheless, he is only in error from defect of inductive power. There is a Catholicism, a pure and peaceful Catholicism maturing in these United States; but one which is as foreign to the Roman or any other olden form of a general religion, as light is to darkness. We will now endeavor to illustrate its chief peculiarities.

That a gradual generalization of religious views into two specific and antagonist creeds, will sooner or later take place as a due accompaniment of our political divisions, is, to say the least, not improbable. Sectarian creeds of manifold varieties, as they are now found in the United States, are, or are becoming, anti-American. They have, in general, had their origin and growth out of circumstances altogether foreign to the spirit of our institutions; and may be justly regarded, each according to its age and birth-place, as adaptations of Christianity, or, to cover all cases, adaptations of religion to governments and social conditions never known in America. As yet, they exist among us, by a sort of hot-house cultivation, with little change from their original characters; but because we have not yet made these things conform to the bold precedent established by our revolutionary patriarchs in the political institutions of the country, they will forever resist the genius of freedom, would be a vain and preposterous supposition. If our political institutions be true and right, they will certainly be lasting; and will make all other social and individual interests, at the least so far conform to them, that obvious discrepancies shall vanish. The citizen

will control the individual. The societies called the States will subdue all other societies and combinations. As all forms of the olden Catholicism received their peculiar characters largely from the political institutions in the midst of which they were matured, so the general religion of these United States must in the end partake of the essential features of the constitutions and laws.

But we have still stronger assurance of the truth of our proposition, in the NATURE OF MAN, as developed under the auspices of free political institutions. To this point the treatises of De Toqueville witness with extraordinary force. The effect upon man *and men*, of the combined circumstances, both natural and political, in which the people of our States have, for some sixty years, been fulfilling their singular mission, is surely a subject worthy not only of close observation, but also of the profoundest philosophical reflection. It is here demonstrated that man is capable of self-government. There is no longer room to doubt this important fact. If then, he be capable of self-government in a political sense, that sense which but one hundred years ago was universally regarded to be grossly absurd; is he not also capable of self-government in his religious relations?

To answer this question satisfactorily, it is requisite that we first ascertain the nature of, and therefore the proper distinction between, men's political or social interests, and their religious obligations. And here, it is due to the memory of a remarkable mind to say, that the late rapid progress of general intelligence, more particularly in America, bears convincing testimony to the truth of his theory of the nature of man; however strangely illustrated by his very peculiar talents. The *triple* constitution of every intelligent being on earth, which is an elementary principle of the doctrines of SWEDENBORG, can scarce at this day be denied by any individual who has looked within himself. That outwardly we are mere animals; that even the intellectual element, the region of opinions and professions, is not

fully *ourself*; and that behind or within all we say or seem, presides the ruling passion, the motive temper, the *real* man, are, we think, facts strikingly demonstrated by the whole history of hypocrisy and dishonesty, — which is, in fact, the whole history of individual and social man, — a history which seems about reaching a remarkable climax, in the celerity with which false reputation, false wealth, and, we fear, false creeds, shamefully called religions, are together marching to general ruin. If, however, the present apparent crisis in our social affairs shall prove not to be decisive, it is evidently an instructive indication, that the industry of the natural man, though stimulated to oppressive excess by the theories or *faiths* of his mentality, can result but in vexation of spirit, unless some hitherto obscured or suppressed element of his being, more profound than any of the attributes of mind, shall redeem society from its threatened dissolution. The great foundational error of this world evidently consists simply in this, that a *plethora* of mind has tainted every human interest, religious as well as social. The creed of the Roman, as well as of every other known Catholicism or sect, is as mere a combination of ideas and forms, as is the honor, respectability, or wealth of society. And surely, if the natural conservatism of opinion, — and fixed opinions are as stubborn as long indulged habits of body, — can scarce longer conceal the emptiness of conventional greatness, it must soon find a still harder task in preserving the imposture of conventional purity.

It is long since mankind have become quite intelligent enough to discard the mere animal attributes from their estimate of the human character. It may well be supposed that ample evidence of the intellectuality of the species was never wanting; but the will and the understanding, the feelings and the opinions, the soul and the mind, have always been confounded together. The will, comprising all the affections, and ever acting without deference to the understanding, will be best comprehended by the Swedenborgian de-

signation of the man, *homo*; while the sentiments and opinions belong to the man, *vir*. The affections, then, are those manifestations of active being, common to the race or genus, or which, in other words, indicate the *catholic* man. Of these there can be but two classes; the good and the evil; while the affinity of opinions, and the accord of habits, are of infinite variety, and ever tend to the grouping of individuals into petty societies and combinations. Our thoughts, which are always either sincere or evasive, — either truths or falsehoods, are easily communicated by one to another; but our feelings, though never so poignant to ourselves, are comparatively obscure to others. The soul, the simply catholic man, can therefore freely commune only with itself, or with the God who made it; unless we suppose, as we may indeed hope, that when the dominion of creeds, — the tyranny of prescription, — shall have passed away, some novel medium, either in an extreme refinement of poetry or eloquence, or acute sympathy of nerve, by which soul may act directly upon soul, will be evolved in the progress of time. If this were practicable now, the actual Church, — the final Catholicism, would promptly manifest itself; and until the kindly affections of men are allowed to commingle much more freely than at present, or than at any well known period of past history, all Catholicisms must be corrupt, because wholly artificial, and because of the heartless inventions and deceptions which are perpetually issuing from the minds of men.

An opinion, when reconciled to the predominant desires or passions of the soul, either frankly or only habitually, becomes confirmed into fixed belief, and is a part of the individual's faith. But faith, in its best and purest form, resides wholly in the mind. Even truth, which, in a certain abstract sense, we all spontaneously reverence, and justly associate with the general idea of perfection, has neither power nor value, and may be said not to exist, unless in due juxtaposition with active benignity. That faith only which comes from within by the prompting of love, and which is neces-

sarily informal, is profitable to man ; while that which is from without, and prompted by fluctuating notions of expediency, may beguile the feelings of the recipient, but can never afford the genuine and heartfelt consolations of religion. A system of religious ceremonial which is instilled into youthful minds, and enforced upon a whole people, whether they receive it by education and habit, or by law, must be void of actual religion, because void of disinterested and productive benevolence. In America, men have become perfectly independent of each other in their creeds of political faith ; there is nothing of this sort established by law or education. Nevertheless, there is with us abundance of *politics*, — of deep and abiding interest in the social state. Now, while this is certainly true as regards political considerations, it would indeed be matter for surprise if prescription were necessary or advantageous to religion. The religious relations of men, referring to peace on earth and imperishable glory, are of similar character, however superior to the social, which refer to the temporal welfare of a people, and the perpetuity of their personal and mental liberties. He who is conscious of possessing *both* soul and mind, and therefore, of being a consistent inhabitant of *two* moral worlds, can scarcely fail to recognise this important analogy, and to discern and love the universality of that law, which has already exalted the citizen far above the subject, and will assuredly so exalt the independent Christian above the subjugated churchman.

We therefore repeat : A peculiar Catholicism is promised to mankind. 1st. In the very nature of our political institutions. The general tolerance of religious persuasions, in the United States, has been supposed to favor specific dissensions from known creeds, and thus to promise an increasing complication of discordant churches, and an ultimate confusion and explosion of all. Out of such chaos, or during such disintegration, however, and simply because religion is an inherent want as well of human society as of the human soul, some novel form of a general church will assuredly

spring up, from the free operation of far more natural affinities, and with far less of the art expedient, than has yet borne witness upon mother earth. As the great experiment in human nature, which it has fallen to the lot of our favored people to try, has not only already proved successful in all its political features, but also evinced an unexpected capacity in man, — his containing within himself all that there is or can be of nobility and strength, so is he yet to demonstrate the self-possession of genuine veneration, and manly duty, to the entire overthrow as well of consecrated belief as of anointed power. 2d, and chiefly. This great promise is sustained by that modulation of all individuals' affections or feelings, which is, and must be, concomitant with the characteristic changes in the attributes of mind. It is already apparent that the stability of our political institutions consists not in any magic influence of law, nor yet in the force of education or example, but in a distinct perception of their beauty and rectitude, or in that deep-seated interest or love for them which essentially appertains to the citizen or freeman. There is then, in liberty rightly understood, or, as we would rather express it, in liberty sanctioned and strengthened by the affections, — which eminently implies the association of *order*, — a decided tendency to invigorate the soul; to submit the littleness of the individual to the greatness of the man, and thus eventually to convert society in mass into a true and triumphant church. But ere this tendency can be consummated, the present belligerent stage of angry controversy, and proselyting mania, must be endured for a while; for if we mistake not, ecclesiastical conservatism will prove far more stubborn than any other form of that general, however varying power, which steadily retards the progress of reform, — the development of man.

It is sufficiently easy to discover some of the more marked gradations, by which man, as he is developing in these United States, must come to absorb, so to speak, all the true elements of religion, as he already has those of the social relations. That incessant re-

currence of the individual to the inherent and profound resources of his own mysterious being, which De Tocqueville repeatedly certifies to be a prominent characteristic of the American citizen, and by which we have lost faith in all traditionary institutions, and mere hereditary and transmitted worth, has, while urging "individualism" rapidly toward the extreme of refinement, nigh driven it into an organic unity of the collective race. Few, who at all reflect, can fail to perceive that it is the artificial classification of mankind, into certain unfounded castes of the high and the low, the learned and the ignorant, patricians and plebeians, priests and laymen, princes and subjects, — to say nothing of innumerable sub-genera and species, — rather than the free scope of personal or individual peculiarities, which has enfeebled, and thereby corrupted the race, and engendered the chief of those social evils everywhere so revolting to true moral sensibility. "Individualism" has its immutable laws, absolute and alike in each and all; which laws, when allowed to operate without let or hindrance, — however at first, and that by conflict with external influences and prejudices of mind, their effects may appear destructive and anarchical, — must, in the end, assimilate the species, and evolve all the glorious phenomena of original and eternal ORDER; — that order which exists in man himself, and alone vivifies and sustains him; precisely as it rules in universal nature, rightly circulating the ever intermingling elements, and perpetuating the vast unity of the seemingly incongruous mass.

There are probably but few of our citizens who have not occasionally had, in moments of abstraction, a more or less distinct internal perception of what man should be, and therefore will be, in the eventual subsidence of all artificial commotion. The GRAND MAN of Swedenborg, has indeed already appeared, or, in the progress of the great moral revolution now pending, will appear to all, a configuration, as one might say, in fancy, of general society according to the pure laws of genuine order; which, as they are common to all things, must

ever result in effecting a certain similitude to man, which is the similitude of God. In this one general being, — for whom alone there is a heaven above, and the heaven of heavens, for a mind and a soul, — each *vir*, as a constituent atom, must find his place. It is self-evident that only in some accurate arrangement like this, can the individual perfectly fulfil the whole utility of his existence. And it is equally evident that an associate arrangement, which will thus afford the precise place and office of every diverse individual, must possess essential harmony, and exercise only the simplest and purest attractions between its constituent particles. No crowned or mitred molecules can enter there. No specific agreements, fictitious claims, and spurious relationships can there hold good. Each atom alone, in naked and skeleton simplicity, without any sort of intellectual or ceremonial disguise, must take its place, and participate in common emotions and joys. And we would ask, is not society in this country verging towards a realization of this, if the reader please, imaginative sketch? It is. Royalty is gone, with many other fictitious institutions and relationships, which formerly were supposed to be indispensable bonds of the social union, and nevertheless, society not only holds together, but its members are happier, securer, better than before. The power of wealth is weakened; the influence of scholastic learning is despised; in a word, all the extrinsic qualities of men are waning away, and yet, society gains strength, because of a more than proportionate increase of practical information and general intelligence, and of the freedom and activity of the affections. In all these things there has been an evident progress among us, and new phenomena of the same kind will, doubtless, become gradually developed. As those which are transpiring in our midst are, undeniably, accompanied with blessing, we must infer that they sprang from a holy fountain, and will be followed to systematic consummation by others more wonderful and blessed than they. All, without an exception, of the old fictions of power, which have

been supposed to regulate the political, social, or religious relations of congregated mankind, must in due, uninterrupted series, give way to that great constructive work, which has here been so happily begun, and which must not, cannot cease, until the new moral temple be complete in all its parts:

To the religious interests of *man*, the principles we have now endeavored to unfold, apply with even stronger force than to the political relations of *men*. Religion belongs exclusively to the *homo*; precisely as association appertains to the individual *vir*. Minds are certainly more susceptible of congeniality, or, in other words, are less individual, than persons; but nevertheless, they can, at best, but associate or combine mankind into states and societies; which, though not necessarily destitute of some measure of passable or forbearing accordance among themselves, have nothing in common of the pure element of unity. To the general and but too incongruous phenomena of this associating principle, we apply the term *social*, while it is to another and very distinct class of moral operations that the name of *religious* is given. From the earliest time, certain exercises of the feelings and affections, having an evident and strong tendency to system, have been recognised as the noblest attributes of Humanity. These feelings, the same in all men, and at all times, however they may fluctuate in particular or general intensity, can submit to no other classification than the good and the bad,—the religious and the reverse. Religion is not a loose external addendum to human nature, but lies deep within man and mankind. Its world, a world of liberty, indeed, is but covered over and obscured by the worlds of nature and of mind. The natural individual may full easily submit to coercion, slavery, and even beastly degradation; the mental *vir* can be deluded by artificial imagery and sophistry; but the *homo*, the soul, secure in its own quickened and very peculiar sensibility, cannot bow, and, all appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, never has bowed to any other supremacy than that of its **LORD** alone.

Thus, in the true order of successive character, the religious being of man has precedence in all things of the political and the natural; and, therefore, while in this favored land a manifestly improved decency has covered the general aspect of personal conduct, and mind has indignantly thrown off the shackles of the old social formulas, we may confidently assert, that the religious principle is duly gathering together its rightful and independent powers, to result in a glorious republic of the church, to flourish with, and be ever superior to, the republic of society.

As the restless intercirculation of persons, in the outward concerns of life, is in these United States, attended with less of jostling, and of the incidental disgusts of clashing ceremonials, than abroad; and in rightful accompaniment of this, the associating principle is now of unrivalled activity; so we may be assured that above all other people WE LOVE ONE ANOTHER. The deeper relations of the citizen with his peers are manifestly encroaching upon all conventional relationships; so that by correct observers, our "equality of conditions" may be discovered to have invaded, and considerably simplified, even the *family* association; the oldest, and very probably the firmest of the merely natural and legal forms of society. This gradation of our progress is agreeable to the feelings of the deep-seated man within us all; as witness De Tocqueville;

"Such is the charm of these democratic manners, that even the partisans of aristocracy are caught by it; and after having experienced it for some time, they are by no means tempted to revert to the respectful and frigid observances of aristocratic families. They would be glad to retain the domestic habits of democracy, if they might throw off its social conditions and its laws; but these elements are indissolubly united, and it is impossible to enjoy the former without enduring the latter." — Book III. Chap. viii.

Now, if we herein recognise, as we may, that the time is approaching, when no one of us will call another *father* upon earth, and he only our *brother*, who sympathizes with us in the inexpressible, though undisguisable workings of the affections, we may surely indulge the hope, that all other features of the one only

religion will be duly manifested and increase with this, so that true Christianity shall become identified with, and confirm our social institutions. This subsidence of the family relationship, or rather, this merging of it, as of a surreptitious speciality in the general vortex of communal interests, though but one of myriads of like sparkling indications issuing from out of the foulness of individual life, serves well to illustrate the progressive law by which a pure Catholicism will grow up in this land, and become the resultant feature, the great final cause of the many revolutions, out of which our peculiar institutions have been gathered together.

We may also here briefly point out, as important premonitory indications, the recent vast expansion of *Journalism* in this country, whereby that systematic book-trade, which is itself conservative and essential to conservatism, is threatened with utter annihilation; and the system of voluntary *Lecturing*, of late come into vogue, which bears the same relation to "regular" preaching, that independent journalism does to book-making; the one being addressed to, and of course controlled by a limited class of society, while the other is the property of the public at large. Even that pompousness of speech, and inflated style of writing, which De Tocqueville specifies as two of our more exceptionable characteristics, are consequential items of progress. It is certain that language, which has long adapted itself to mere *mental* conference, must, in some way, become applicable to far profounder communication. Our author well observes;

"In aristocracies, language must naturally partake of that state of repose, in which everything remains. * * * * The constant agitation which prevails in a democratic community tends unceasingly, on the contrary, to change the character of the language, as it does the aspect of affairs."

We require a language which may convey emotions as well as ideas. It has been jocosely said, that speech was invented to *conceal* our thoughts; which, if understood as referring only to modern times, and to the concealment of the feelings and desires, is but too well

founded in truth. If vocal language be not susceptible of thorough reformation, or of keeping pace with the general progress, then will it eventually become an inconsiderable gift to man; and, perhaps, silence reign forever in the eternal church.

Finally, the theory of *constituencies* has here been gradually ripening into pregnant and prophetic meaning. The efficient embodiment of *many* in *one*, as their political representative, though once but an artifice, or trivial concession of unrighteous power, has with us approached to a reality, without diminution; but, on the contrary, with much increase of individual consequence in the state. Let any one ask himself seriously, to what extent this important principle may become spontaneously developed, and stop short, if he can, of an organic catholicism of the church, as well as of society. But specific proofs of the position we take are numberless, and their detail, if possible, would be unnecessary in a brief review of the general principles of human congregation. We may, however, remark, that all these things, as the visible ultimates of a radical change in the *moral currency* of the country, which has long been spurious, and which it has been attempted to *bank*, or control by select conclaves of conservatives, and but too successfully, are not only in themselves remarkable signs of the times, and conspicuous gradations in the progress of American society, but evidence the advent of a new order of communal passions, and of a diffused and practical intellectuality, of which they are but the first fruits. Collectively, all must result in the maturity of a very general, though yet unrecognised faith, alike destitute of superstition and ceremonial obedience, and wholly based on that *voluntary principle*, that simple action of the feelings and affections, which is ever sought to be controlled by all manner of mental devices, even on the part of those who most profess to approve it.

There is, then, no growth of infidelity in this country; no tendency to materialism, but directly the reverse. The feeling is becoming more and more gen-

eral and vivid, that as it was the *homo*, by its submission to the deceptions and beguilements of the *vir*, that originally prestrated the true dignity of man ; so also, by the institution of another manliness, by a regeneration of the *homo*, in a majority of the constituent members of society, as well as in the collective whole of the GRAND MAN, is life, innocence, and virtue restored to mankind. It is not possible, that *this one* or *that one* man, or *this* or *that* little group of men, can possess exclusively the spirit of religion ; precisely, as it is not possible, that a human heart can live without the viscera and organs, which together constitute a body. We may readily admit, that one organ, or component part, is more conspicuous, to us, than another ; but a system and gradation belongs to the whole, which is totally at variance with the idea of exclusiveness. It is, therefore, MAN, in the vast unity of a complicate people, and by a due organic rather than homogeneous embodiment, that must eventually constitute the only church. The institution of this church, and its gradual, peaceful, but rapid progression to maturity, is amply foreshadowed in the onward march of our political evolutions. And while our beloved country, and, of course, in some measure, the whole earth, is thus witnessing to the diffusive nature, and future transcendent glory of the true body of the LORD, an important corollary accompanies the living demonstration, namely, that man must retrograde, and social liberty vanish from the world, to enable any of the old sects or Catholicisms to triumph over him.

ART. V. — *The Religion of Nature Delineated.* Fifth Edition. London. 1731. 4to.

THIS is an old book, but none the worse for that. All that is old is in some sort venerable ; and he who can look upon anything, over which has flowed the current of human affections, or rolled the tide of ages, without feeling his heart stir within him, is no true man. Hope in the future, efforts to work out a greater good for oneself, one's country, or one's race, do not require us to make war upon the past ; nay, reform itself is often only a return to principles, of which, in our hurry and confusion, we had lost sight, and to the simplicity and open-heartedness, from which we did unwisely to depart. There is always hope of a man who has not lost all his reverence for what has been. He retains still somewhat of the child, and may grow in wisdom, in favor with God and with man. There is hope too of the age that goes back and explores the by-gone, studies to get at its secret, and labors to reproduce it in history and in song. It shows that it has some filial piety, some loyalty, and is willing to do its own work, without calumniating those who have placed it in the world.

In this matter of books, especially English books, the old is altogether better than the new. England has done little, one may say nothing, for the world of ideas since her "Glorious Revolution." Her contributions were made in a prior period, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. She struck out her theories then, and has since been principally engaged in the struggle to reduce them to practice. Her literature, since the accession of William and Mary, that is, since the inauguration of whiggism, has been poor stuff, or rather has had no stuff at all. It is light, flimsy, indicating on the part of the nation no deep spiritual experiences, no sturdy grapplings with the great problems of the universe ; a thin, mechanical, steam-engine sort of life ; with faith only in man's digestive organs, and hardly so much as that.

This old book belongs properly to the age which preceded the Revolution of 1688, the latter part indeed of that age, but nevertheless to a period when there was still some faith in the people, some fondness for, and some power of looking into serious subjects. It is worth a number of Hartleys, Priestleys, Bentham's. Its author was William Wollaston, whom we must not, as many do, confound with Thomas Woolston, an alleged deistical author, who wrote against the miracles, and some other things. This Thomas Woolston, however, was not half so much of an infidel as he has been represented; he was a believer in many things, a serious sort of a man, with some insight, who had too much honesty to call that sacred which was not sacred to him, and which he could not, in any light he could view it, make even *appear* sacred. In his way, he tried to get some solid ground on which he could stand, and not feel every moment that it would slide from under him. Nevertheless he is classed, and rightly classed, with Morgan, Tindal, Toland, Chubb's, Mandeville, Collins, deistical writers, who flourished in England at the commencement of the eighteenth century, a superficial, narrow-minded set of writers, yet not without some respectable instincts; men who deserved a better fate than literary history awards them; and who have exerted a far wider and more lasting influence than we commonly imagine. England was always too full of cant, especially cant religious, to profit much by them; but they passed over into Germany, and have given rise to the Kantian philosophy and its consequences, not yet ended.

But William Wollaston did not belong to this class of writers. He was a sober, serious, religious man, never, we believe, at loggerheads with the church, though no bigot,—a quiet sort of man, amiable, modest, retiring; who went through the world injuring no man, making war upon nobody, trying to save his own soul by cultivating a peaceable and devout temper, and by purifying his heart and enlightening his mind. God, man, and nature were great and solemn facts to

him ; realities, that were something, and had a meaning, if one could but come at it. He looked at them bravely, without hurry or passion, did his best to find out what they meant ; and the result we have in this old book, which many have read, some have admired, and which will be found in our Antiquarian Bookstores for some generations to come, — at least we hope so.

William Wollaston, we have said, was a religious man. He was one of those old English writers who studied Plato. He, then, we may know, had a tendency to a spiritual philosophy, or as we say in these times, to Transcendentalism. The world was not a mere Appearance to him. Something lay at the bottom of it ; and therefore it was no bottomless pit, not the Devil's world, but God's. He believed that if you would penetrate deep enough, you would find it resting on something solid, permanent, everlasting ; nay more, that it was no chance-world, thrown together any how or no how, but a God-created world, made according to some plan, design ; which plan or design was eternal and immutable Truth as it lay in the Divine Mind. Therefore in its transcendental sense the world was a Truth and no Lie. Therefore is it man's duty to conduct himself towards it and all pertaining to it, as if he felt it a Truth and no Lie, a reality and no fiction. Therefore, again, his ethical rule, act always according to truth, the truth of things. In all things there is a truth, find it out, and conform to it ; treat everything as it is, and for precisely what it is. In thyself too there is a truth, discover it, and obey it. That is, be thyself, and not another, or a something else ; be a reality, and not a fiction. Say in whatever you are, do, or say, that Truth is Truth and no Lie ; Falsehood is falsehood and no truth, and I will none of it.

Moral philosophers have criticised this rule, and attempted to show that it is inexact, incomplete, or not sufficiently definite. They may be right ; and yet we fancy they would be puzzled to lay down a better. "Act according to the fitness of things," says one. With all my heart. But wherein differs "fitness of

things" from "truth of things?" Is not that which is true always "fit?" Is that which is false ever "fit?" "Follow nature," says another. The false appearances, the shows, shadows, or the truth of nature; nature as a reality, as firm, immutable Truth, or as a splendid Lie? "Seek perfection," cries out still another. All very good. But wherein lies perfection? In being false to the truth of things, to the truth of thy own nature, or in being true to it? "Seek order; universal order, as the highest, the only good," hear we again. All well. But order, what is it, but conforming to the real truth of things; adjusting all particular truths to the universal truth? "Obey the will of God, and send philosophy about its business," enjoins the priest. Good still. But the will of God, is it a truth or a lie? What is the truth of nature, the truth of man, but the will of God? Is there any truth at war with God's will, any falsehood in harmony with it? After all, we see not but Wollaston's rule, like Aaron's rod, swallows up all the others, and upon the whole is as good a formula, if formula we must have, as we can invent or discover. It has the advantage of not being an *empty* formula. It has substance in it, and would, if obeyed, never lead to a false result. Be true, not false, a reality, not a fiction; be what you seem; treat God, nature, man, as they are; live a true life, not a false; according to the reality of things, not according to the shows of things. Get always at the heart of the matter. If this be the Devil's world and not God's, then treat it as the Devil's; if it be God's world, and not the Devil's, then treat it so, treat it and all that pertains to it as God's.

But be this rule metaphysically exact or not, we cannot help believing, that it would go much better with man, with all men, individuals and society, if they would adopt it, at least follow it, whether they consciously adopted it or not. The world is dreadfully given to lying. One would almost think, that men had come to a general understanding to give up truth altogether, and to use in its stead some painted semblance of it. As paper representations of gold are thought by some

to be far preferable to gold itself, so is it thought that the pretensions to truth are far preferable to the reality. Look at individuals; the last thing you shall get from them shall be the truth; and for the very good reason, truth is the last thing they get for themselves. Into the heart of whatever is to them a matter of concernment they rarely look; they see not the thing as it is, and for it they give you some semblance, at best only an outward hull, husk, or covering, when the kernel was what you wanted. Ever do they even for themselves eat husks with the swine. Go to them with the truth, they shall stare at you, as if you were a madman; and they will know not your truth either by sight or by taste. They have been living all along in a vain show, have lied so much, repeated their falsehoods so often, that they have even come in some sort to believe them, and to reverence the bottomless as if it had a bottom.

All this we may see exemplified in a thousand ways. Perhaps just now there is nothing in which men are falsier than in their religion. Their faith is a no-faith; their worship a make-believe. Not that worship itself is to be condemned, not that the doctrines professed and contended for are not true. The falsity is not in the doctrines, but in men's pretending to believe them, and even persuading themselves that they do believe them, when they do not. The evil lies not in the fact, that there are places of worship, that men, women, and children congregate there, that the minister prays and preaches; but in the fact that all this is mere empty form, that men do not worship, that they have no heart in the matter, and are all the while only making believe. Far be it from us to say, that no true worshippers of God can be found in our churches. In the worst of times God reserves to himself seven thousand, who bow not the knee to Baal. But men have now lost, at least with us, their faith in religion, their faith in church-going. They do not regard the doctrines the church proclaims, as great and solemn realities, as awful facts, which a man should not listen to without having his whole soul stirred. They do not feel that what they

call divine service is an offering up of the heart, the solemn, awful sacrifice of oneself to the Everliving God. In it there is no devoting of oneself to the service of God, truth, duty, humanity, justice, mercy, liberty. It is a cold, heartless service, a mere mockery, which men hurry through, because they fancy it decorous to do so, because perhaps it is proper to do so by way of keeping the peace, because, — God save the mark! — it is setting a useful example to the poor, the less cultivated, the less enlightened!

Now all this is false, false as the bottomless pit. We assuredly mean neither to speak against religious worship in general, nor any form of worship in particular. True religious worship is the noblest act of the soul. When the soul truly worships it is in its sublimest state; it calls up and pours forth all that is noble, generous, loyal in its nature. The soul that never worships is a dead soul, not a living; and deserves not to be named a soul. It has abandoned its birthright, abdicated its divinity, foresworn its sweetness, and is a mere dry, withered, hard, dead, and deadening thing, as incapable of a worthy act, a generous emotion, a spiritual function, as a stock or a stone. Nor matters it so much what the form of worship is. All forms are good, so long as the worshippers themselves can find substance in them. It is not easy for a devout soul to express all that it feels towards the Everliving God. The emotions, which rise in a true soul when communing with the Invisible, are unutterable. All speech fails us, and our most expressive language is in general silence. The various forms of worship are the various manners, modes, through which the soul struggles to utter what it feels, and which it never but imperfectly utters. All true feeling lies too deep for utterance. When two meet who really love, they are silent, and leave their hearts to flow into each other in their own mysterious way. Words seem almost a profanation. Nevertheless, there are times when utterance becomes a necessity. The mode and manner of it, is a matter of little moment, if it be sincere, if, as far as it goes, it

express what is really passing in the depths of the heart. We therefore find fault with no man's form of worship ; that is always best to any given man, which best expresses what is best and purest, truest, loyalest in his nature. The evil is in adopting a form, observing a form, which has no longer any significance to him who observes it ; which has no longer any capacity of expressing what he feels. Then he is false, sincerity has died out of his heart, his worship is a mockery, and if he believes it essential, that God will approve him for it, he believes God is a Lie, and an approver of Lies. All such observance of the forms of worship is solemn blasphemy. In this sense they are right who tell us, that the prayers of the wicked are an abomination to the Lord.

Here is the falsehood in which our community walk in regard to religion, — a dry, hard, *unspiritual* community, wanting faith even in the devil ; yet putting on with great solemnity the forms of faith and piety ; making grimaces and genuflexions ; garnishing the tombs of the prophets ; speaking with a sanctimonious twang ; dealing forth their condemnation in no measured terms upon the luckless wight, who, believing no more than they, has the bluntness to say so. Here they are, talking of the great utility of the Bible ; of the blessed institutions of religion ; the blessings of a preached Gospel ; the shocking wickedness of Infidelity ; the awful condition of those who are living without God and Christ in the world. Out upon this miserable cant. Look into their souls, and you shall not find faith enough to save even the soul of a musquito from damnation. Their very truths become falsehoods ; and of all infidels they are the worst. Miserable canters, worshippers of mere forms, who think by fair words, and pious tones, to pave the way over hell to heaven, remember God is Truth, not a Lie ; that no Lie can pass current with him ; no make-believe supply the place of Reality. Be what you seem ; either worship in deep, solemn earnest, which is best ; or give up your pretensions, stand out, and say in just so many

words, without any circumlocution or reticence, what you now say by your actions, that this is not God's world, but Satan's.

Religion is the practical view which a man takes of his relations to the Invisible. It concerns the state of his soul, his inner man, out of which streams all that he is, whether good or bad. It is too serious, too solemn, too awful a matter to make a jest of. Whoso meddles with it at all, should do it in deep earnest, in sadness of spirit; engage in it as in a struggle of life and death. It is, when once it really comes up, the one all-absorbing question, and there is no rest for us till we get at the bottom of it; till we come out victorious. When, in the soul of any man, the awful question arises, How stand I to the Invisible? there is a downright earnestness, and intenseness of feeling, which, as fire the flax, consumes the hay, wood, and stubble of your vain pretences, hollow forms, and cant, and hypocrisy. Nothing then will answer but the truth, the real truth, God's truth. There can be then no pretending to believe. The world is giving away, all things are vanishing, he himself is sinking, and he cannot think of *upholding* this or that doctrine for the good of the community; he cannot talk of *upholding* truth at all; he feels, all over and within, tremblingly feels, that truth must uphold him, or he falls, falls — where there is no bottom. Then he does not fear that truth will fall through unless he sustain it, but that he shall fall through unless truth shall sustain him.

This earnest soul may attend church, may bring an offering and lay it upon an outward altar; but he does it not because it is decorous to do so, because he feels it necessary to countenance religion, support it, for the sake of order and good example; but because there is a necessity laid upon him, because he needs must go there on his own account, and would go there, though nobody went there; because he must needs worship there to relieve his own heart, and bring peace, serenity, and joy into his own soul. He goes there because he meets God there. It is with him a serious, solemn,

truthful act. But to go there as the world does is mockery. A man who can go into one of our fashionable or unfashionable churches, compose himself quietly to sleep while the minister discourses on the awful realities of the unseen world, and then come home feeling that he has been performing an act of worship, that he has a right to regard himself and to be regarded as upon the whole a religious man, a Christian, one of God's worshippers, is one of the most impudent liars we can conceive of. He is false from beginning to end, from top to bottom, inside and out, given over, as one may say, to believe a lie, be a lie, live a lie, that he may be damned. Stay at home, go into the fields, ride out for your pleasure, work in your shop, your counting room, or on your farm; anything by which you can act out any particle of truth there may be in you, is better, and less offensive to your Maker.

No man does or can overrate the importance of a preached Gospel. But this wheezy drone, this sanctimonious drawl, these rhetorical mouthings, which greet us from most pulpits, are the farthest remove possible from the Gospel. No doubt the words the minister utters are good words enough in themselves, and the doctrines are true enough; but the fact is, nothing is said, nothing is *preached*. The minister means nothing, the people catch no meaning. Had he comprehended his own words, had they meant anything for him, his own soul would have been stirred, and he would have stirred the souls of others. But it was all a form with both him and them, and which both were glad to get through with. This is what we complain of. This is the falsehood; calling that the Gospel which is no Gospel to those who extol it; calling that excellent for which they, who call it excellent, have no respect in their hearts. He who preaches the Gospel truly is in sober earnest. Out of the depths of his own sad experience, he speaks words of lightning, which rive and shatter the hearts of whomsoever hear him. His tongue is touched with a live coal from God's altar, and he speaks always with power, as one

having authority. Whoso can so speak, let him speak. There will be a whole Evangile in every word he utters. You will have no occasion to speak of the blessedness of his preaching. You will rarely think of his excellence. You will not praise him; you will curse him rather. But some how or other he will lodge a word or two in your heart, where they stick fast, and where stick they will, fight and wrangle as ye may; and you will soon find that you have business enough of your own to attend to, without concerning yourself with him. Never a true word fell to the ground. It lodged somewhere, and the world has not seen the last of it.

No doubt it is a blessed thing to have the gospel preached, to have Sabbaths, churches, public fastings and prayers, and all that, and much more; but there is that which is more blessed still, — **TO PREACH THE GOSPEL, AND LIVE IT.** Give us the thing itself, not your praises of it. These praises are rather dull when the thing itself is kept out of sight, and go far towards making one doubt whether the thing be at all. Show us the beauty and worth you talk of, and spare yourselves your panegyrics. If it be true beauty and worth, as no doubt it is, give yourselves no uneasiness; our love and reverence for it may be as great as yours, whether we adopt your mode of uttering them or not. Good people, you are quite too noisy about religion; a little more devout reverence, true religious feeling, and you would find silence your most expressive praise of the Invisible and Unnameable.

This same general falsehood men carry into their doctrines. We have said their doctrines are in general true. So they are. But the doctrine is not the truth itself, but the form with which the understanding has clothed the truth. All doctrines are then in fact symbolic, mere symbols of the truth. All the great doctrines of the church, no doubt, cover a great and sacred truth, essential to man's spiritual well-being; but it is that truth, not its doctrinal form, that is essential, that is needed. The true believer is not he who holds fast

to the form and bids you swear by that ; but he who has taken the truth itself up into his heart and life. To get at this truth is what we call getting at the heart of the matter ; and it is only by getting at the heart of the matter that we can become true believers. Yet our religious people overlook this ; or if not, throw every possible obstacle in the way of your doing it, and fancy that God will love them and save them for holding on to the mere form, husk, hull, or covering. In this sense the doctrine is no truth, but a lie, and they hope to go to heaven for believing a lie. That is, they believe, practically, that the world is a lie, that God is a lie, and that salvation comes by lying.

These doctrines are emblems of truth ; all nature is an emblem of truth ; truth springs up in each blade of grass, unfolds in each flower, shines out in each star, peals in the thunder, flashes in the lightning, descends in the rain, falls in the dew, whispers in the breeze ; but what then ? You receive not the truth, unless you perceive that all nature is emblematical of it. The falsehood lies in the fact that you take the emblem as an emblem, and yet as emblematical of nothing. You see the shadow, take it as a shadow, and yet admit no substance of which it is a shadow. These doctrines of which we speak, people see clear enough, are mere husks, hulls, coverings, but covering nothing. The doctrines themselves stand in the minds of the great mass of the people for no great facts in their own experience, in the life of Humanity, or in that of the universe. They are seen and felt to be mere dead idols ; and yet are they insisted on with tenacity, contended for with vehemence, as if they covered, for those who contend for them, great, universal, and permanent facts. This is the falsehood. These doctrines once covered great and essential truths. These truths remain, and are as essential now as ever. They shine out to some as clearly through the doctrinal forms the church has adopted as ever they did ; but to the majority they are no longer symbolized by those forms. Those forms have become to them opaque, — silent, uttering nothing. To

contend for them is not then to contend for the truth, and the great mass feel that there is no truth *in* them, find no truth in them, and yet contend that God will damn us, that we are "damnable heretics," if we do not swear they are God's truth. Said we not truly that the people practically believe God is a lie, and that salvation comes by lying?

No doubt a man is sanctified only through the truth, saved only through believing in the truth; but before you call a man an infidel, be sure that you know what he believes. Perhaps, without your forms, he has after all got at the heart of the matter, and believes with all his mind and soul in the very truth once shadowed forth by your doctrines, and which would be shadowed forth by them to you now, were they to you anything but dead forms, mere hulls, that have no longer any kernel. He may, after all, be the believer, and you the infidel; than which stranger things have happened. If he have the kernel, he is better off than you with the empty hull. Get at the kernel; no doctrine is a truth to you, or the emblem of a truth, that does not cover for you some fact of your own experience, some real law of nature, or of providence, manifested in either the outward world or the inward; and to contend to the contrary is to contend for falsehood.

Into society and the political world we might go and find still further illustration of the general falsity that prevails. But in these the fact is very generally admitted. That the majority of the social institutions of all countries are based upon falsehood, founded on a lie, as well as the greater part of people's social and political conduct, will at this late day hardly be questioned. The Devil is a lie, and the father of lies, and he, we have Scriptural authority for calling "prince of this world." Moreover, we have heretofore spoken very freely of social and political falsehoods, and therefore need not to do it again. The echo of what we said last July, when treating of the laboring classes, has not yet died away. In passing to our conclusion, we would signalize one trait of honesty in the present dominant

political party. They claim more loudly than any other party among us, the name of democrats; but to their praise be it said, they have had the honesty to tell us that they claim the name, not for what it signifies, not because they are the true friends of political and social equality, but because they wanted to get into power, and to get into power under any other name, in this country, was out of the question.

But it is time to end our homily. Yet we cannot do it without taking a little notice of our literary friends, the men who speak to the public, whether through books or other mediums. They come under the general censure. They are not true men. They do not tell their honest thought, speak out boldly, without circumlocution or reticence, what they honestly believe. They do not believe in truth; they dare not rely on truth. Some of them are afraid that truth will make a disturbance, turn society topsy turvy, upset every thing, and dethrone God himself. Others dare not rely on truth for themselves; if they tell it, they shall lose caste, incur reproach; perhaps be exposed to suffering and want. Truth is unable to sustain them, and so they must appeal to falsehood! God is not able or willing to take care of those who are true to him, so we must call in the Devil to help us! Pitiable! Suppose it to be so; which is better, to be false, a base, cringing, sycophant, afraid to say your soul is your own, and have bread and butter, and say a gig to boot; or to speak out your own honest thought as a true man, and starve? Better, a thousand times better, to starve, being a man, than to live and flutter, having belied your manhood. To starve,—well suppose you do starve, what then? Is there an end of you? Has truth deserted you? Know that whosoever has had virtue enough in him to compel a lying world to deny him a place whereon to lay his head, and to compel him to starve, has had enough to render him immortal. He lived truth, a true life, and no true life can ever die. The words he uttered were words of God, which sound out through all space, and fetch their echoes from eternity.

Some eminent writers compromise the matter. They tell the truth, at least so that *they* and those who knew it before hand, can detect it in their words; but so that the uninitiated cannot; they for whose sole benefit they were called upon to tell it at all. This is an attempt to get round both God and the Devil. From God they demand wages for doing his work, — telling the truth, — that is, eternal life; and of the Devil they demand the good things of this life, for doing his work, that is, *not* telling the truth. They should be scorned by both God and the Devil.

But enough. There is but one course in any sphere of life, becoming a man, that is to be true to himself, to act out the truth of his own nature; in such way as he can, to bear witness to the fact that he believes in truth, is not afraid to rest himself on it, come it to his mind and his heart in what form it may. God has no enemy but falsehood. The Devil is no reality, he is from the bottomless pit itself, and he is the antagonist power to God. If we believe that falsehood can prevail over truth, the Devil over God, hell over heaven, and that that which is bottomless, resting on nothing, is firmer grounded than that which rests upon absolute reality, then we may continue our general system of falsehood, we may be false in our words, our deeds, our lives, for then the world were the Devil's, and our duty were to serve him. But if we believe the world is a reality and no fiction, that God is, and not a phantom, that there is something in the universe at all on which there may be reliance, then we should say *avant* to the Devil, cast all lies and lying behind our backs, declare that no falsehood can be a truth, and go forth with such hearts, minds, instincts, hopes, aspirations as we have, and in such speech as is given us, be it articulate or inarticulate, *doing*, or *being*, or silence, utter the truth, whatever of truth, though it be the veriest infinitesimal of truth, there may be in us. No matter what reception we meet. If the world treat us well, so much the better for the world; if not well, so much the worse for it. No harm can come to us. The God of

truth is with us, and we are children of the truth. We may be cast into the fiery furnace, heated to seven times its usual heat, but there shall be not so much as the smell of fire on our garments. Curses may be heaped upon us, our names vilified, our characters traduced, our bodies crushed, and our bones cast out to bleach under heaven's rains and dews; but the truth we had, and have, survives, works its own work, scatters in due time the Devil's legions, dissipates the mists of falsehood, and shines forth in radiance the God it was and is.

EDITOR.

ART. VI. — *Address to the People of the United States.*

By JOHN TYLER. Washington, D. C. April, 1841.

IT is not our intention to enter into any elaborate criticism of this Address from the President of the United States. As an important state paper, it falls far below that of Mr. Tyler's immediate predecessor. General Harrison's Inaugural Address has been underrated, and unjustly accused of being non-committal. A President, on entering upon the duties of his office, ought not to be expected to go into a detailed statement of the measures or the policy he will recommend, or to which he will or will not give his official sanction. All he can do with decency, is to state his views of the principles of the government he is called to administer, and the spirit in which he proposes to administer it. This General Harrison did as fully as could be required. The fault of his Address was not in its no-meaning, but in its wrong meaning; in embodying in their exaggerated form, the principal errors which have obtained, or do obtain, in regard to the nature of the Federal Constitution and Government.

These errors may all be summed up in the one fundamental error of regarding the Federal Government as

instituted by, and resting on, the will of the majority ; as a government which, in the words of General Harrison, "a breath of the majority has made and can unmake." If this were true, the some seven large States containing a majority of the population would have the constitutional right to govern, at will, the other nineteen. The local interests of these would rightfully rule, regardless of the diverse interests of all the rest. But it is well known that the constitution is not made by the will of the simple majority, but by the concurring majorities of the several States, and the government can never exercise, without usurpation, any power which more than one fourth of the States choose to withhold. Consequently, the government must, in practice, confine itself to what concerns all the States in common, and leave those matters and interests, which are peculiar to each, to the exclusive supervision and control of the State governments.

It was losing sight, for a moment, of this important fact, that led Mr. Madison to adopt the rule for determining the constitutional powers of the government, now so strenuously insisted on by the party in power. Mr. Madison, in his justification of himself for having signed the bill incorporating the late Bank of the United States, when he had opposed a bank on the ground of its unconstitutionality, alleged that a "power repeatedly exercised by Congress, and acquiesced in by the people, should be taken as constitutional." A more dangerous rule it is not easy to conceive of. If the stress be laid on the *acquiescence by the people*, it virtually abrogates the Constitution ; for it leaves the majority free to pass any law they please, that the people will tolerate ; which is precisely what the case would be, were there no Constitution at all. If the stress be laid on the *repeated* exercise of the power, it asserts that wrong by repetition becomes right. If on the repeated exercise *by Congress*, it claims for the simple majority in Congress the power of determining what the Constitution shall be, of altering or amending it, — a power which, according to the Constitution itself, belongs only

to the concurrence of the several States, or at least to three-fourths of them.

The adoption of this rule by Mr. Madison, we presume, accounts for the fact, that he is now the pattern statesman with those who could once hardly find in the English language words of sufficient force, to express their abhorrence of him and his measures; and the fact, that he is now the pattern statesman with these, should teach the old Republican, States Rights party, that they have too feebly protested against the rule to which he, in an evil hour, gave his high authority. Mr. Madison was a great and a good man, whose services to his country are not easily measured; but the injury he occasioned, in this instance, to the cause of constitutional liberty, is one from which we shall be long in recovering. It was indeed one of those mistakes, to which the wisest and best of men are liable in cases of perplexity and emergency; but it is one which the earliest opportunity should be seized of correcting.

Mr. Tyler and his party have adopted this fatal rule for determining the constitutional powers of the government; we trust that we shall, therefore, be pardoned for having entered our protest against it, as a rule which virtually abrogates the Constitution, converts the Federal Government into a government of unlimited powers, and gives to the simple majority, acting through Congress, freedom to pass any law they please, providing the people will acquiesce, and not rise in rebellion and plunge the country into the horrors of civil war.

Mr. Tyler and the party now in power, so far as we can collect, appear to believe that the great danger to our liberties lies in the "tendency of power to concentrate in the hands of a single individual;" and, therefore, that the evil, we should most studiously guard against, is executive usurpation and the extension of executive patronage. But in our judgment this belief of theirs is founded on a superficial view of the actual tendencies in our own country. They do not seem to us to have noted with sufficient care the wide differ-

ence there is between our confederacy and one of the small city-republics of antiquity. The tendency they dread is resisted by the vast extent of our territory, and its division into separate, sovereign States; by the diverse interests, and institutions of different sections; the multiplicity of rival candidates, with nearly equal pretensions and abilities; and by the general equality of our citizens.

No one man, however eminent his talents or his services, can ever succeed in commanding the suffrages of all the States. Always will there be entire States in the opposition; and one State, under our system, is always competent to bring the government back, in any of its departments, within constitutional limits. The danger, Mr. Tyler dreads so much, can exist only in small communities, where the interests are homogeneous, but where the population is divided horizontally, and parties are noble against ignoble, or rich against poor. There indeed rival parties may aid the concentration of power in the hands of their respective leaders, because each may find it necessary to do so in order to secure its triumph over the other. But with us parties are not and cannot be formed according to the horizontal division. The trial has been made, and without success. Our population is all noble; and though we have rich and poor, neither party takes in all the rich or all the poor.

Our population also has an innate jealousy of power, when exercised by a single individual, an hereditary hostility to it, which has come down to them from their ancestors, who warred against monarchy, to the knife, in the family of the Stuarts. This innate dread, this hereditary hostility to this concentration of power, which characterizes nearly the whole of the American people, is no mean safeguard, and deserves altogether more reliance than Mr. Tyler and his party seem disposed to give it.

Then, again, our Presidents are in the main simple executive officers. Saving a conditional veto, they are neither makers nor judges of the law. The President,

it is true, commands the army and navy; but he cannot declare war; he cannot unsheath the sword till the people, through their representatives, command him. He perhaps, in a certain transcendental sense, may be said to hold the purse, but he cannot open it or take a cent therefrom, till the law gives him leave, and tells him what to do with it. His usurpations, from the nature of the case, must be open, palpable, and therefore easily guarded against; and be they what they may, as they are always ministerial usurpations, they can always be remedied by a simple change of administration.

The real danger, to which our liberties are exposed, lies, we apprehend, in legislative usurpations, rather than in executive. Against legislative usurpations, our people are not so much on their guard; and these are always usurpations which receive the sanction of the majority; for no law can pass the two Houses of Congress without the consent of the majority through their representatives. The opposition to them comes only from the minority. They must then always be hard to resist, and still harder to redress. New elections, or the gradual enlightenment of the people, will not redress them; because they are demanded by the interests of the majority, and the majority will return representatives pledged to sustain them.

Legislative usurpations, furthermore, are rarely looked upon in the light of usurpations by the great mass of the people. They have the sanction of the majority, and it is no easy matter to convince the people, that what has the sanction of the majority, is or can be a usurpation. The prevailing creed of the country asserts, with scarcely any but moral limitations, the absolute right of the majority to govern. We also retain the memory of the struggle of our fathers with the monarchs of England, when all power, conquered from the monarch by the parliament, was thought to be so much gained to liberty. We go on the supposition, that all power exercised by the legislature, freely chosen by the whole people, is exercised by the people themselves;

and that all power exercised by the people themselves is coincident with freedom. We have not yet learned, that the people, taken as individuals, may be completely enslaved to the people taken as the body politic, or civil society; that to establish the absolute freedom of the people, as a body politic, to do whatever they please, is to establish the absolute subjection of the whole people taken as individuals. The ambiguity of the word *people* deceives us, and leads us to infer, that where the popular sovereignty is complete, there is absolute freedom, when in fact there is and can be only absolute subjection. But recognising always the popular sovereignty in the acts of the legislature, and identifying popular sovereignty with freedom, we rarely fear legislative usurpation, and in general suffer without alarm the legislature to grasp powers which it has no right to exercise.

Here is the real danger. There is a wide difference between popular sovereignty and true freedom, and the people as a body politic, as civil society, may be as tyrannical in their acts as any despot, and encroach on the rights of the individual citizen with far greater impunity, and with far less danger of insurrection, rebellion, or revolution. We regret that Mr. Tyler, when discoursing on the dangers to which our liberties are exposed, did not see proper to remind us that power could concentrate in the hands of Congress, as well as in the hands of the President, and that the true policy of the country should be to guard against this concentration in the hands of either branch of the Federal Government.

Our fears of legislative usurpations, so far as concerns the Federal Government, are by no means imaginary. The Federal Legislature is steadily usurping powers not delegated to it, and bringing under the action of the Federal Government matters, of which its framers never intended it should take cognizance. Already has it engrossed the chief business of legislation, and become in fact the only important legislative body in the country. If its usurpations be not checked, and

more effectually than they were under even the administrations of Jackson and Van Buren, it will not be long before consolidation is consummated. Mr. Van Buren's administration, as far as it went, was in the main unexceptionable ; but somewhat deficient in boldness and nerve. The hand that guided had its cunning, but not quite all the vigor desirable. A little more of the rough energy of Jackson would have been an improvement. Nevertheless, the country may count itself not a little favored by Providence, if it do not long have to regret the defeat of that much calumniated administration, if it soon find another as good, as faithful to the Constitution.

We know of but one remedy for the evil we have here pointed out, and that consists in a hearty return to the fundamental idea of the Federal Government, to the States Rights principles of the old Republican party of '98 ; in understanding that our maxim, the majority must rule, can apply to the Federal Government only within the limits prescribed by the Constitution ; that the Constitution is paramount to the will of the majority, and rests on the concurrence of the several States, each of which is, for itself, its own judge of the grant of powers it has made to the Union. This will prove a peaceable and an efficient remedy ; and between this and complete consolidation there is, so far as we can see, no stopping place.

But although we regard the chief danger as lying in legislative usurpation, we are still inclined to regard the executive patronage as too great, as dangerous, and requiring to be curtailed. But here again we are under the necessity of differing from Mr. Tyler. He seems to fancy that the evil lies in the active interference, as *individual citizens*, of office-holders in elections, and therefore seeks to guard against it by declaring such interference a disqualification for holding office. He tells us that no man shall hold office under him, who takes an active part in politics. But the evil, in our judgment, does not lie in this interference ; nor is it one that can be reached by Mr. Tyler's rule of non-interference.

The rule is itself a flagrant instance of its own violation. It is, to say the least, no mean stretch of executive authority. It strikes at the rights of the States, by presuming to say what part certain of their citizens may or may not take in their political contests. It brings the patronage of the government into direct conflict with the freedom of elections, by enabling the executive to control them by all the force derivable from men's love of office, or desire to share in government plunder. It enables him to make every office-holder in the land his servile tool, and furnishes him the means, if disposed to use them, of buying up every prominent political opponent he can induce to accept of an office, and thus often to distract, and in the end discomfit, the party opposed to his administration. Is there no executive encroachment in this? Is this the efficient way of curtailing executive patronage?

Then again, the rule is unequal, and will operate only on political opponents. No administration will ever dismiss a faithful and efficient officer because he uses his best exertions, as a citizen, to sustain it. Mr. Tyler could not have supposed his constituents would credit his assertion, that he would apply the rule equally to his friends and opponents. Has he done it? Has he removed any of his friends who held office under the late administration? Are we to infer that none of them took an active part in the late presidential election? We presume not; and yet we have not heard that any of them have been removed. Nor will Mr. Tyler remove any officer of his own appointing, however active or zealous a politician, if not found wanting as a faithful and efficient officer. No administration can afford to dismiss its friends for doing what of all things it most desires them to do; and Mr. Tyler should have respected the good sense of the American people too much, to have pretended to the contrary. He should have spared them at least that insult. For himself, though blessed with his usual "good luck," we can assure him, that long before his term of office expires, his administration may need the active and

zealous support of all the friends it can retain or make, whether they be in office or out of office.

Mr. Tyler's rule encroaches, also, on the rights of the man and the citizen. The man and the citizen are not sunk in the officer. An office-holder may do whatever he has a right to do as a man and a citizen, not incompatible with the faithful discharge of his official duties. In what manner he exercises these rights is no concern of the Federal Executive, for he is accountable for their exercise to another tribunal. To inquire how he votes, how many speeches he makes, or how much money he spends for electioneering purposes, is as extra-judicial, if we may say so, as it would be to inquire whether he lives in a framed house or a log-cabin, drinks hard cider or champagne, eats white bread or brown, and sleeps on a feather bed or on a pallet of straw. The relation between the executive and the office-holder is purely official, and no question transcending that relation can be rightfully entertained. If the officer neglect his official duty, he should be removed, not for taking part as a citizen in politics, but for neglecting the duties of his office; if he transgress the laws of the State in which he resides, he should be turned out, not for electioneering, but because every government is bound to see that its agents respect the laws of the sovereign within whose dominions they reside.

The rule, furthermore, is indefinite. What is interfering in elections, — "active partizanship," as it is called? He who goes quietly to the polls and deposits his vote, is an active politician, compared with one who votes not at all; and a partizan, for he most likely votes for one party or another. Shall the citizen be deprived of his right to vote, because he is an office-holder under the Federal Government? We have not heard this pretended. Where then will you stop? May not the officer, without forfeiting his office, tell his honest convictions to his neighbor on political matters? If not, you abridge the freedom of speech, a thing which no branch of the Federal Government can attempt without

violence to the Constitution. If he may tell his honest convictions to one man, why not to as many as choose to listen to him? If in one place, in one position, why not in another? Where then will you draw the line between simple non-interference at all, and the most active interference compatible with official fidelity, the laws of the State, and general morality?

But the evil does not lie in the part the office-holder, in his simple capacity of a citizen, takes in the politics of the State or Confederacy. The citizen loses, in general, more than he gains by the officer. The man who holds an office has, as is well known, almost always less influence when he addresses his fellow-citizens on political subjects, than he would have were he wholly disconnected with office. If he sustain the administration, he is regarded as personally interested in its success, as wishing to keep the administration in power for the sake of retaining his place; if he oppose the administration, he is regarded as ungrateful, as cursing the hand that feeds him, and so has little influence. That administration cannot be very oppressive, which keeps men in office who use their best exertions to overthrow it. In a word, an office-holder taking part, as a citizen, in politics, goes out before his fellow-citizens under disadvantages rather than advantages, and can rarely if ever, exert with the mass his legitimate share of influence. There is then no need of Mr. Tyler's rule.

The evil does not lie here, but elsewhere. It lies not in any interference of the officer, as a citizen, but in his *official* interference. No office-holders, except such as have patronage to bestow, can cause any portion of the evil; and those who have patronage to bestow, cause it not by voting, writing, or lecturing, but by bestowing their patronage, not with reference to fitness for office, but with reference to services rendered or to be rendered to the party. A collector of the customs, for instance, brings his office to bear on elections, when he appoints to office, or removes from office, with reference to these services. His duty is to select his officers with

sole reference to the public service, and he transcends the line of his duty when he has reference to anything else. Other things being equal, he may no doubt select his personal or political friends in preference to those who are neither one nor the other; but he interferes officially, whenever in his appointments he leaves it to be understood that the persons appointed, in addition to faithful officers, are to be also active partizans; or when he removes a faithful and efficient officer, who is not an active partizan, and appoints to his place one who is. The Supreme Executive, however, causes the chief part of the evil, and is guilty of direct official interference, when, on his accession to power, he removes from office those who had opposed his election, and fills their places with the most active and least scrupulous of his partizans.

The real cause of complaint seems to us to lie in the fact, that a change of administration involves a general change of office-holders throughout the country. Not because one set of men are turned out and another set put in, for in this alone we see no great harm; but because so long as it is so, office-holders must feel that their chance of retaining their places depends solely on keeping their party in power; and because office-seekers, — a much hungrier and more numerous herd, — must see that their chance of obtaining office depends on ousting that party, and putting in another. The effect of this is to bring into our elections elements which should always be foreign to them; is to make them contests for place, perhaps even more than for principles. Here is the evil. These removals, which make so much noise, do not disturb us; the public good is rarely promoted by keeping a man in office, who would be essentially injured by being removed. But any policy on the part of the administration, which has a direct tendency to bring personal and selfish considerations into our elections, should be avoided as much as possible. The stability of popular institutions, in a great measure, depends on the purity of elections, and on making them contests for principle, and not for place.

On this point the late presidential campaign should read us an instructive lesson, — a lesson which should be all the more deeply impressed on our minds and hearts, from the fact that a righteous Providence has already taken to their reward several of the prominent actors in it. The country can bear much, but not the frequent repetition of the scenes enacted during the last year by the present dominant party. Such demoralizing scenes as they enacted to the bacchannalian shouts of “hard cider,” and “log-cabins,” are poorly atoned for by their present extraordinary pretensions to piety and virtue. Mr. Tyler may well call upon the country to fast, not indeed because an infirm old man, who had filled up his three score years and ten, has been removed from a post for which he had scarcely a single qualification, but for the arts his party resorted to in order to win their victory, the falsehoods they circulated, the deceptions they practised, the low and sinister motives to which they appealed, and by which they were governed. A few more such victories, won by similar means, and it will be time for even the most sanguine among us to begin to despair of the republic.

We pretend not to say that desire to obtain office led to all the extravagant and mischievous proceedings, by which the present dominant party succeeded in raising itself to power. There were other and more powerful causes at work; there were men who wanted not the government so much for the sake of office, as to aid them in their speculations, to pay their debts, and raise the price of stocks lying dead on their hands. Here were the more active causes of that disgraceful scramble, which will hand down the name of Whig to everlasting infamy. Still the love of office had its influence, and served to swell the tide of corruption.

The remedy, the means of separating the scramble for office from our election contests, is far from being easy to find or to apply. It may perhaps be found, to some extent, in lessening the emoluments of office, so that they shall not be worth scrambling for. This would do somewhat. If office-holding should, in a

pecuniary point of view, fall below the general average of business, so as to demand a sacrifice on the part of the officer, it would not be sought after. But in this case could offices be filled by men worthy to hold them?

In addition to this, if consistent with an efficient executive, which we must always have, and with which we must not dream of dispensing, we may make the appointing power and power of removal the same; that is, in all cases, where the consent of the Senate is necessary to complete the appointment, it shall be necessary to the removal. The President should have only the power of suspending, during the recess of the Senate, such officers as may be unfaithful, inefficient, or incapacitated. For ourselves, we incline to the opinion, that the power of removal is incident to the power of appointing, and should be so regarded.

Furthermore, we might make all appointments for a term of years fixed by statute, and all officers during that term, — excepting those whose political opinions necessarily have a direct bearing on the administration, — irremovable, except for causes previously specified by law. The end we aim at is preventing a change of administration from involving any general change in the incumbents of office; to get rid, in a word, of the "spoils" principle, and with it the influence which love of office has now in our elections. If this be desirable, as we hold it is, we see not how it can be done without taking away a portion of the discretionary power of the Executive. As a first principle in political science, we should leave the executive as little discretionary power as is compatible with its efficiency. These two measures would take away the greater part of its discretionary power, not over appointments, but over removals, and give to the office-holder, so long as faithful and efficient, a certain independence of the administration. This would add much to the dignity of office-holding, and enable us to fill public offices with men of worth and independence, men who are reluctant to take an office, when they know that the first revolution of the political wheel may throw them out. In the ordinary

course of events, offices could not all become vacant at once, but successively ; consequently, a change of administration could not involve the general change we have complained of.

The term of years should unquestionably be short, not exceeding four years at most, because all offices ought to be frequently vacated, so as to prevent the growth of corruption, and to give the appointing power an opportunity of making such changes in regard to their incumbents as the public good may seem to require. New appointments, however, should be made at the pleasure of the appointing power, from the old incumbents or from new applicants. In this way you secure the advantages of rotation in office, without its odiousness and want of legal sanction. Embody always in law that public opinion which you would have reign.

These two changes, it strikes us, will prove an effectual remedy for the evil we have pointed out, so far as in the nature of things a remedy is possible ; and against them we are unable to discover any insurmountable objection. No doubt the members of the cabinet and the principal fiscal officers should entertain similar political views with those of the President, but these would in general be men who would resign in case of any wide discrepancy of opinion between them and the executive ; if not, make them an exception to the general rule. So far as it concerns the great mass of office-holders, it matters not to the public, though it may to party, what their political opinions are, provided they are good officers ; and good officers they may be, with one political creed as well as with another.

Some of our friends fear that these changes would impair the efficiency of the executive ; if so, they ought not to be adopted. But unless we would have despotism, we must place some limit by law to the executive power ; and no limit would, in our judgment, be too strict that should leave it room for the prompt and faithful execution of the laws. The inability to remove a faithful and able officer for a mere difference of opinion, when that difference could not interfere

with official conduct, it would seem need not impair executive efficiency; and beyond this we do not propose to go.

Others again, object to the interposition of the Senate in removals, on the ground that the Senate is an aristocratic body, and we ought therefore to be on our guard against swelling its importance, or enlarging the sphere of its action. We do not sympathize with them either in their views of the Senate, or in their fears of the aristocracy. We never, if we can help it, suffer ourselves to be misled by mere words; and these terms, *aristocrat* and *democrat*, have been bandied about so much, that they now stand for anything or nothing, according to the temper of those who use them.

Ever since the Senate had the audacity to place itself in opposition, on certain occasions, to General Jackson's administration, it has been, with some, a mark of democracy to stigmatize it as an aristocratic body. We are sorry to see this, as it evinces a tendency from which we have much to dread for our liberties. The nature of all popular masses is to make war upon whatever interposes an obstacle to the immediate realization of their projects. If their favorite executive finds an obstacle in the Senate, then it is, down with the Senate; if a favorite legislature is frustrated in its attempts to carry some popular measures by the executive veto, then it is, down with the veto; if the cry of liberty is up, and men are bent upon freeing the slave, but find the Constitution in the way of the kind of action they would adopt, then it is, down with the Constitution; human rights are older than Constitutions, and shame on the coward, who would be deterred from vindicating them by fear of a piece of musty parchment.

This is a dangerous tendency, and the one against which we should always be on our guard. The institution we would sweep away, because it is unfavorable to the realization of the project we have at heart to-day, may turn out to be the only institution by which we can realize the still dearer project we may entertain to-morrow. The Senate, which interposes a barrier to-

day to a popular executive, and therefore seems to be aristocratic, may to-morrow interpose a barrier to executive usurpations. This tendency, we speak of, is encouraged by many good men, because they confound what should always be kept distinct, — popular sovereignty and the freedom of the citizen. They call alike democracy, the absolute sovereignty of the people, and the maintenance of the individual citizen in all his natural rights. Their theory is, establish the first, and the second is secured. Hence, whatever opposes in any instance the popular sovereignty, is termed by them aristocratic, and unfavorable to liberty. We repeat to them what we never cease to repeat, and what we have ever occasion to repeat, that *between popular sovereignty and individual liberty there is a wide difference; and that to clear the way for the free, unobstructed dominion of the people as civil society, is but clearing the way for anarchy or despotism.* The people, as a body politic, are as supreme in this country as they ought to be. The liberty we should now struggle for, is not, strictly speaking, *democratic* liberty, that is, the liberty of the people, but individual liberty, or securing to each and every citizen the free and full enjoyment of all his natural rights. And this is to be done, not by shouting “aristocracy,” or “democracy,” but by wisely organizing the State, so that it shall have no power to encroach on the individual, but be always able and obliged to protect him. Liberty with us is to be carried out, not by the heavings to and fro of a lawless mob, but by the orderly workings of constitutional government. In this country we are permitted to seek no reforms but in accordance with and through constitutional government. Our first duty to liberty, to the inalienable rights of man, is to establish and maintain constitutional order. Consequently, every attack we make on the sacredness of Constitutions is a stab at the very heart of liberty.

With this view of the method we must adopt to promote true liberty, we cannot view with indifference the attacks which some of our friends make on the Senate.

The Senate is unquestionably a conservative body, and so to the State that has not somewhere in its organization a conservative body. Without the conservative element embodied in the Senate, our Federal Government would soon fall to pieces. The Senate represents the States, in their sovereign capacity, and tends to preserve their independence. It no doubt now and then serves as a check upon the will of the majority; but this is one of its recommendations. It preserves the government from yielding to every burst of popular passion, and from being swayed by every undulation of popular caprice. It therefore gives stability and something of systematic unity to the action of the government.

The Senate is an essential part of the Federal Constitution, and unless we would destroy the Constitution itself, we should beware of throwing suspicion on it. For our part, we are satisfied with the Constitution as it is. It is to us a miracle of wisdom. We see clearly the hand of Providence in it, and we have a sort of religious veneration for it. We do not believe it needs amendment, or that we are capable of amending it. The less we attempt to alter or amend it, the better will it be for us, and all who are to come after us. Let us encourage then no disparagement of any of its provisions. Let us take it as it is, and make it the guide of our political action; and therefore let us leave the Senate standing. Destroy the Senate, and the independence of the States will fail to be recognised, the American community will become a consolidated mass, whom whoso can may ride by the grace of God, as king or kaiser.

"But the Senate is an aristocratic body." What then? Perhaps your State is none the worse for that. Solomon exhorted men in his day not to be religious over much; if he lived now, he could not fail to exhort us not to be *democratic* over much. We do little but scream democracy from morning till night, and from night till morning; and those of us who scream the loudest are by no means the truest friends to real equality. Aristocracy is a natural element of every society,

and should be recognised in every State, unless we mean by aristocracy institutions or doctrines, which create artificial distinctions between man and man, subordinating the many to the few. Whatever opposes the maintenance of all the natural rights of every citizen, should be opposed ; but we are aware of nothing in the Senate, either in its constitution or the mode in which its members are selected, that makes it in the least more hostile to these natural rights, than is the House of Representatives ; nor do we discover that the Senate has ever shown any more disposition to abridge the natural freedom of the citizen, than is commonly shown by our State Legislatures. We believe some of the most distinguished advocates of equal rights, the country can boast, are to be found at this moment in the Senate. If such men as Mr. Calhoun, Mr. Walker, Mr. Wright, Mr. Buchanan, Mr. Benton, not to mention any more, are aristocrats, where are our democrats, in any sense in which it would not be a misfortune to be a democrat ? It will hardly do to call a body, of which such men as these are leading members, aristocratic. That aristocracy which consists in the possession of eminent talents, in being distinguished by the performance of eminent services to one's country, is honorable, not censurable, and deserving of confidence, not distrust.

But we close. We have introduced this objection mainly for the purpose of protesting against the tendency in our community of which we regard it as one of the symptoms. We would warn our countrymen against this tendency, — a tendency of which they who are governed by it are in general unconscious. With this, we leave the suggestions we have thrown out, to go for what they are worth.

EDITOR.

ART. VII. — *Message to the two Houses of Congress.*

JUNE 1. By the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

THE present is the most important and interesting crisis that has occurred in our political affairs, since the adoption of the Federal Constitution. Governments, as individuals, are rarely able to extricate themselves from the fatal consequences of their primitive mistakes. But our government is now in a condition to do it, to abandon its past errors, and to assume a new direction, one in harmony with the Constitution and the true interests of the Confederacy.

The existing administration came into power under the most favorable circumstances. It had not to incur the odium of breaking down the fabrics of past error and folly; for they had been demolished by the two preceeding administrations, which for doing it had been driven from power. The ground was then already prepared to its hand; a glorious opportunity was given it of redeeming the country, and of securing it the blessings of good government. But from the first we have been compelled to ask, will this new administration prove equal to its position? Is it composed of men of enlarged and patriotic views, who can comprehend what is demanded of them, — of pure minds and pure hearts, who will not shrink from doing whatever is necessary to be done? Will they put the government on the right track, in the direction pointed out by the lights of fifty years' experience, and by the wants of a great and growing empire?

We asked these questions, we own, not without some misgivings; but we resolved to repose "a generous confidence" in the new administration, and hold ourselves in readiness to give it a cordial support, if it should prove itself at all worthy of the high trust committed to its charge. We have, therefore, waited not without anxiety for a development of its policy. That development, to a certain extent, we now have in the Message before us; and we must say, that all our doubts

are confirmed, and nothing, but the weakness of the document itself, saves us from the fear that the most fatal measures will be fastened upon the country.

From General Harrison we had never hoped for aught remarkably sound in policy or vigorous in execution, and we were not surprised that the Goddess of Liberty dropped from her hand the scroll of the Constitution as he approached the Capitol. But him an All-wise Providence early removed, and we may not, therefore speak of him as we might, were he still living, and at the head of the government. We are not his judge; we will not be his accuser; and we have seen nothing in his official career to make us his eulogists. He is gone, and while many weep, we say, peace to his ashes. We will merely add, that we think our clerical brethren, who have recently flooded the land with their fulsome eulogies, might have been as well employed, had they remembered that it is their especial vocation to rebuke sin, and praise only God.

From Mr. Tyler, however, we own, we hoped something more. We had been accustomed to regard him as a faithful disciple of the old Virginia school of politics, as a strict constructionist; and, though perhaps not a man of the highest order of intellect, as capable of appreciating a wise policy, and possessed of the moral firmness to sustain it. It was not then without some degree of satisfaction, that we saw him at so early a day placed, by the death of the President, at the head of the government. We felt that now the Constitution would be safe, and that if all the good we wished should not be effected, at least the evils we most dreaded would be averted. We would fain feel so still; but this Message puts it out of our power, and compels us to regard him as one of those men, whose apparent size diminishes in proportion to the height they are elevated.

The only redeeming trait of the Message, as we have already hinted, is its imbecility; but imbecility placed in certain positions never wants the power to do incalculable mischief. The policy it develops is, with but

slight modifications, the very policy which has hitherto proved disastrous ; and it will require the President to give his support to measures which cannot be adopted without corrupting the government, and through that destroying the liberties of the people. If Congress shall sustain this policy, as we fear it will, the government will be placed in the same false direction that has hitherto defeated the intentions of its founders, and which it must, without the interposition of Providence, pursue for at least another half century ; and before another half century can elapse, the country, under the influence of a mischievous policy, will be lost to liberty ; the few will become so wealthy, the many so poor, and all so corrupt, that Freedom will disdain to dwell among them.

The Message is not very explicit, nor very consistent with itself ; but we can make out, we think, its dominant tendency, and its principal recommendations. One of its recommendations is the repeal of the Sub-Treasury. On the policy of what is called the Sub-Treasury we have heretofore given our views at length, and will not therefore go into its discussion again. Nothing since the passage of the law has occurred to change our views of the policy on which it is founded, and we were not a little gratified to find that Mr. Tyler himself had nothing to allege against it, but the very questionable fact, that the people, in voting for General Harrison, stamped it with their disapprobation. But the people, in our judgment, have not decided against the Sub-Treasury. The party, which may be thought to have voted against it, did not vote against it in fact, for they were, so far as the immense majority of them were concerned, as innocent of any acquaintance with it, as the babe unborn. It was during the presidential canvass no uncommon thing to find a zealous Whig declaiming against what he called the Sub-Treasury, but it *was* an uncommon thing to find one that had even read the law establishing it. The fact is, our Whig friends during the late Presidential canvass, drank too much hard cider, and were too busy in

hurrahing for "Tippecanoe and Tyler too," to be able to investigate at all the policy on which they made war. That presidential campaign is a curious passage in our history, and will perhaps be read with some interest by the grand-children of those now in power. We are happy to find that the men, who a year ago sang the praises of hard cider, and encouraged scenes of midnight revelry, are now the ardent friends of temperance, and have set themselves at work in right down earnest to reform the inebriate. This augurs well, and foretells other conversions. After a night of debauch, men are frequently disposed to be moral, and do sometimes "fast and pray."

Another measure recommended to Congress is the establishment of a "fiscal agent" of some sort, which shall aid the government in collecting and disbursing its revenues, and establish a currency of uniform value. What this "fiscal agent" is to be, we cannot at the moment of writing conjecture. It is not to be a revival of what was called the "pet bank system," for that, the Message tells us, the people have condemned; nor a United States Bank, for that also the people have unequivocally condemned. What then is it to be? It must, we presume, be some kind of a bank, and a bank of issue too; for one of its offices is to be that of establishing a currency of uniform value.

As a fiscal agent we see not its necessity. The government has now, it would seem, as many agents for collecting and disbursing its revenues as the people ought to be called upon to support. Very few of these will be dismissed, whatever new agent may be created or adopted. It will then be only an additional burden to be borne by the people, — a new agent for plundering them, and all the more efficient, because it may plunder them without their being able to say, in all cases, when, where, how, or how much it plunders them. Is this its chief recommendation? There are politicians whose chief merit consists in their skill to devise ways and means to tax the people, without suffering them to know that they are taxed; but we

would fain hope and believe that the President is not ambitious of being classed with these. These politicians would take to themselves great credit, if they should repeal the Sub-Treasury, and thus save an annual expense of some twenty-five thousand dollars now paid out of the Treasury, though in its place they should establish a "fiscal agent," that should take annually a hundred thousand dollars from the pockets of the people. The reason of this is obvious. The twenty-five thousand dollars are paid out of the Treasury; but the one hundred thousand, though paid, are not paid out of the Treasury. In the first case, the people see and know that they pay, and how much they pay; in the last case they pay, but without knowing how much, or suspecting in fact that they pay anything at all. Banks are expensive things, and their expenses must be borne by the people. We must know then, how much this new fiscal agent will cost, — not the government merely, — but the people, before we can decide whether it will cheapen the expense of collecting and disbursing the revenues.

As concerns the establishment of a currency of uniform value, we must be assured that we have not such a currency already, before we can see the need of instituting this new fiscal agent. We have heard people talk about "the derangement of the currency," but in point of fact there is and has been no derangement of the currency. The eagle, half-eagle, quarter-eagle, dollar, half-dollar, quarter-dollar, dime, and half-dime, are, we believe, of uniform weight and texture throughout the Union, at least pass current throughout the Union at the same value. There is no derangement in regard to these. Is there anything known to our Constitution and laws as money, as currency, except gold and silver? Everybody knows that the money, the *currency* of this country is exclusively metallic, and this currency has suffered no derangement. It is sheer folly then to talk of a fiscal agent for the "establishment of a currency of uniform value."

"But the paper money." — Stop there, if you please ;

we know not the article. There is and can be under our present Constitution, no such thing in this Union as paper money. "But bank notes." Ay, bank notes are no doubt of unequal value in the market, and so are the notes of individuals. Bank notes are not money, but mere evidences of credit, paper securities, and we know of no possible means of preventing them from obeying the general law to which all paper securities are subjected. The credit enjoyed by bank notes will be very much in proportion to the confidence the community has in the banks themselves, and their means of redeeming their obligations, when and where the holders of them may desire. The proposition to establish a currency of uniform value, in the meaning of the Message, is to establish and maintain the uniform value of bank paper, — a matter as difficult as it would be to make the note of the Editor of this Journal, for ten thousand dollars, pass as readily and for as much in the market, as a note of the Messrs. A. & A. Lawrence for a like sum.

But suppose the thing be not in itself impossible, how will this fiscal agent effect it? Will it receive at par in payment of government dues, every species of bank paper, without reference to the character or means of the bank issuing it? So bold a proposition as this, we can hardly persuade ourselves any administration, though composed even of the late officers of the United States Bank of Pennsylvania, or their intimate friends and retainers, would for one moment entertain. Moreover, this would not prove effectual, if done. It would but remotely affect the credit of those banks situated at a distance from the points where the principal portions of the revenue are collected; and it could affect the credit of no bank paper beyond the proportion the government dues bear to the whole indebtedness bank notes would be used to discharge. All the dealings of the country are not with the government, nor the principal part. Consequently, the simple fact, that bank paper is made a legal tender in payment of government dues, has never yet been sufficient to keep it from depreciating.

But perhaps it is to do it as a bank of exchange. As a bank of exchange, we can easily conceive it may be so managed, that its drafts shall be accepted at par throughout the union. But, if the ordinary bank paper circulating where the draft is purchased, be below the value of the paper circulating where the draft is payable, the bank will charge the difference. In other words, if the bank notes which circulate at Charleston be three per cent below the paper of the Boston banks, the bank will not sell to a man in Charleston a draft on Boston, for Charleston paper, without charging three per cent in addition to the regular exchange. And this is precisely what would be the case, were the draft purchased of the private dealer. The late United States Bank rarely furnished domestic exchanges at a lower rate than they could be obtained elsewhere. If I have the specie at Charleston, then of course I can make my payment at Boston without subjecting myself to the three per cent discount. Then the bank will merely charge me the regular exchange, which will be a discount or a premium, according as the balance of trade is in favor of one place or the other. At most, the charge cannot exceed the expense of transporting my specie funds from Charleston to Boston. And this is precisely the case now. The exchanges are as easy now as they ever were, and easier too, owing to our increased facilities of transportation. We saw exchange on Savannah, or Augusta, Georgia, we forget which, quoted a few days since at thirteen per cent. If a man wished in either of those places to make a payment in New-York, and had in his hand the specie with which to make it, would it cost him thirteen per cent to purchase a draft on New-York? Of course not. The difference of exchange is the difference between the value of the paper with which he would purchase his draft, and specie where his debt is to be paid. This difference the bank, as a bank of exchange, cannot get over. We know no law of trade by which it could afford to take depreciated paper at par. Perhaps, howev-

er, our Philadelphia financiers do, and will therefore enlighten us.

Nor will it make any difference if the notes of the bank be used instead of drafts. Admit the notes of the United States Bank should be of uniform value throughout the Union, the difficulty would not be removed. For the notes of the bank must be paid for, and the debtor must pay for them, either in notes of other banks or in specie. To do it in specie will not, with a paper circulation driving specie out of the country, or locking it up in the vaults of the banks, be very convenient. It must then be paid in the notes of other banks. But these notes are below par. Can the bank then take them at par? How long could it keep its own notes at par, if it received in exchange for them depreciated paper? If its notes could be bought up at par with this depreciated paper, for the purpose of making distant payments, it would soon be obliged to stop issuing its notes in all sections of the country, where the ordinary circulation was depreciated below that in the other sections.

Nor is this all. Suppose payments are to be made in the notes of the bank. These notes would be scarce in the debtor sections of the country, and abundant in the creditor sections. In the first they would inevitably bear a premium, and in the second be at a discount. Their own uniform value could not be kept up in spite of the balance of trade. So whether we look at it as a bank of exchange, or as a bank of issue, we see not how it can keep the paper securities of equal value throughout the Union. It certainly cannot do it, unless it drive all other bank paper out of existence, and then its own notes will vary as you pass from a debtor to a creditor section.

But perhaps it is to maintain the uniform value of paper securities, by the control it will exercise over the issues of the State banks. This control can never be complete. In order to be complete, it must at all times have on hand enough of the paper of the State banks to crush them, whenever it should demand its redemp-

tion ; which would imply that these other banks were doing a large amount of business, while it was doing the whole. The extent of its control over the issues of the State banks can never exceed the amount of their bills, which it in the ordinary course of business would have on hand. This can never be more than a small proportion of the whole amount they keep out. If it is meant that it shall do the whole banking business of the country, that is one thing ; then we need not talk about its check on the issues of other banks. If it is meant merely that it shall prevent the over issue of other banks, it can do it to no greater extent than we have stated. The principal control in this case, which it would exercise, would be over the issues of a few banks in the large commercial cities, but it would rarely be more than these now exercise over one another ; and by making common cause with them, it could much increase theirs and its own over issues.

But enough of this "fiscal agent." Paper securities must be left to themselves, to follow the invariable laws of trade. Our error has been, not in suffering them to be used, but in attempting to give them an artificial value, and in confounding them with *currency*, which they are not, and never can be. What the advocates of the bank want is not a currency of uniform value, but some contrivance for dispensing with currency altogether. They know what we all know, that credits up to a certain point extinguish credits ; they, therefore, wish to make them do it wholly, so that no balance shall ever accrue, to be paid off in money. But the fluctuations in trade between different sections of the same country, between different countries and different quarters of the globe, fluctuations in the affairs of individuals, death, casualties, losses by sea and land, fire and water, fruitful and unfruitful seasons, a thousand causes not necessary to enumerate, render this impossible in the present state of society and the world. Balances between man and man, city and city, country and country, will always accrue, which must be paid off before extinguished by the revolutions of business. Credits,

and evidences of credit, will always therefore vary in proportion to their real or supposed power of commanding money, when and where wanted; and this fact proves beyond all cavil the impossibility of maintaining over any considerable extent of territory, in a highly trading community, a uniform value to paper securities, to bank notes, which are after all nothing but evidences of credit. The only wise course for the government is neither to authorize nor to prohibit their issue. It should leave all species of paper securities to go for what they will fetch in the market; and, except so far as to guard the individual against fraud, and to enforce contracts, it should in no way or shape recognise their existence. While it leaves individuals free to exchange credits to as great an extent and on such terms as they can, it should collect and disburse its own revenues in money, in that which is recognised as money at home and abroad.

But we feel no disposition to renew the war against the bank. We have no faith in the banking system; we believe it necessarily false and mischievous; but the time is past when it was necessary to labor to destroy it. It is destroying itself full fast enough. Its doom is sealed, and there is no power in this country that can save it. The great mass of the laboring class are opposed to it, and, what perhaps is more to the purpose just now, a large proportion of the creditor class of the country are opening their eyes to its true nature. Only the debtor class, a class which is composed of desperate men, because in desperate circumstances, are now much in favor of it. But we trust the government will prove itself too wise and patriotic to labor expressly for these. The government always commits its most fatal errors, when it attempts to legislate for the relief of debtors. It follows, it may be, a generous sympathy, but departs from inflexible justice, and ruins itself and country.

But with the influence of the creditor class and the laboring class, both of whom are interested in a sound system of finance, opposed to the banking system, it

cannot long survive. No scientific state physician will attempt to restore it. Some quacks may try experiments upon it; steam it, administer it cayenne and lobelia; for they know that if the patient dies, they will lose nothing in reputation, since they can always say, it died because killed by "the regular Doctors." Doubtless we shall find many ready to revive the system, but they had better prepare to write its and their own epitaph. When a system is seen to fall to pieces by its own weight, it is folly to attempt to save it.

In connexion with the establishment of a fiscal agent for the government, the Message proposes the Distribution among the States of the proceeds of the public Lands. This is the pet measure of the party now in power, as the country will be able to see before this number of our Journal issues from the press, and the one on which it has staked its very existence. Without this measure all its financial schemes will fail, and it will be unable to fulfill, even in appearance, any of the promises it made while soliciting the suffrages of the people. Without this measure, it could hardly put a bank in operation were it to charter one. In these times of bank failures, bank suspensions, and of widespread and deep-rooted hostility to the banking system, a bank needs some solid capital as the basis of its operations. This capital just now can be obtained only from the government. Our capitalists have no money they wish to invest in the stock of a new United States Bank, and foreigners, after the late developments of Mr. Biddle's Bank, will be slow to take stock in another bank of a kindred character. Where then is the capital to come from? Government must supply it in the shape of a national debt, or of scrip based on the probable income for a series of years of the public lands.

The project is something more, we apprehend, than simply distributing the proceeds annually among the States as they come in. This sum would be too small to amount to anything. An estimate will therefore be made of the amount likely to be derived from them for

a series of years, and the whole amount be distributed at once in the shape of scrip to the States. This scrip will constitute a debt due from the United States, which can be funded, and made the basis of the bank. This we apprehend is what the president has reference to, when he speaks of making the proceeds of the lands the basis of the fiscal agency to be established. Of course no one dreams of the possibility of establishing a new Bank without first creating in some form a national debt. As distribution is to be the basis of the new bank, it is of course obnoxious to all the objections to which the bank itself is obnoxious.

Furthermore, this measure of Distribution we dislike, because it is, say what you will of it, assumption, in principle, of the State debts. Its motive is assumption, as urged by Mr. Tyler himself. He urges it because a portion of the States are in debt, and if not assisted must resort to direct taxation, or sacrifice their credit. If there were no indebted States, nobody would bring forward, at this day, a proposition for distributing a portion of revenue among the States. It is the only shape in which anybody among us dares propose assumption. Assumption is unquestionably unconstitutional. The debts of the States, incurred in their simple sovereign capacity, are their own, and the Federal Government has no more constitutional right to assume them, than it has the debts of France or Great Britain. This Mr. Tyler knows, and therefore repudiates the slightest approach to assumption. But can he not see that by distribution, he is doing indirectly, covertly, what he acknowledges he has no right to do directly, openly? How much more praiseworthy is a secret, subtle evasion of the Constitution, than an open and manly violation of it? We hold, we confess, in no high esteem those politicians, who think that the only honorable way to proceed is always to adopt measures avowedly for one purpose, but really for another. Honest and patriotic statesmen never resort to artifice; what they cannot do in an open, direct manner, they will not do at all.

We oppose Distribution because it is intended, as far as it goes, as a measure of relief to the debtor interest. We protest against special legislation in favor of this interest. Debtors can be relieved by government only by taxing for their especial benefit, either the laboring class, or the creditor class, or both. Now, we do not understand the justice or the policy of laying a tax on labor, on industry, prudence, and economy for the benefit of men who have outrun their means, and whose rash plans for growing suddenly rich have ruined them. The measure we are considering is proposed solely for the relief of the debtor States. Mr. Tyler says, "if distribution be not made in some form or other, the necessity will daily become more urgent with the debtor States for a resort to an oppressive system of direct taxation." The purpose then evidently is to relieve the indebted States. Now how is this to be done by distribution? The money distributed is collected from the people of all the States. If the indebted States receive as their portion no more than they had previously paid into the Federal Treasury, why collect it in the first instance? If more, the excess comes from the non-indebted States. The non-indebted States, that is, the States which have managed their affairs prudently and economically, are to be taxed to make up for the losses occasioned by the extravagance and folly of the others. Is this just? Is this sound policy?

The money to be distributed is revenue; it is so called by Mr. Tyler himself. This money has been collected from the people, at an average expense of thirteen per cent. If you distribute among the non-indebted States an amount equal to that which they have paid, you have of course no more to distribute among the indebted States than you had previously collected from them, minus the thirteen per cent, the cost of collection. Now, if you have so much surplus revenue, why not reduce your taxes, which would add to the means of the indebted States not only the surplus you propose to distribute, but the thirteen per cent, they must pay for its collection; for the distribution, we take it, will

cost five per cent at least, the average expense of collecting direct taxes. The people are thirteen per cent worse off, in these indebted States, after you have collected and sent back to them your surplus, than they would have been had you left the surplus in their pockets. Now, a system of financial operations occasioning a loss equal to this per cent is, in our judgment, worthy of adoption only by the financiers connected with the United States Bank of Pennsylvania.

The Message calls direct taxation "oppressive." But if it were not for the system of *indirect* taxation that now prevails, the president would as soon think of setting fire to the Capitol, as of bringing forward such a proposition as this of Distribution. If the people knew what is the fact, that they have been taxed for the money, and have paid the money out of their own pockets, which he proposes to divert from the legitimate application of the revenues of the government, he would not dare propose the measure he does; nay, meditating such a proposition, he would not dare look a single tax-payer in the face. We have no right to presume the ignorance of a Chief Magistrate of the Union; we are bound, in courtesy at least, to suppose that he comprehends the principles and measures he supports. We have then some difficulty in accounting, as we would, for his extreme horror at direct taxation, though it is resorted to by every member of the confederacy. Is it because he knows that where direct taxation is resorted to, there is a limit set to the extent to which the people can be plundered? that the people, if they know when and how much they pay to the government, will demand of it what it does with the money it collects,—a demand it, or its managers, are not always over and above willing to comply with? that, if not the most honorable, yet the safest way to plunder a man is not to meet him on the highway in open day, and cry, "Stand and deliver," but to come upon him in the crowd, or when he is asleep, and pick his pocket, when he can neither see who you are, nor defend himself? We would hope not.

The measure is censurable, because it strikes at the independence of the States. Mr. Tyler contends for State Rights, and he even counts so far on the simplicity of the American people, as to allege that the doctrine of State Rights demands this distribution. The doctrine of State Rights, we had thought, meant the entire sovereignty of each of the States composing this Union. In adopting the Constitution no State parted with its sovereignty, or any portion of its sovereignty. The Union is not a sovereignty, has none of the attributes of sovereignty. The sovereignty inheres in the States, and the Federal Government is merely an agency which the States have established by mutual compact, for the management of certain interests common to them all. It is not supreme over the States, but they are supreme over it. Now, whatever tends to convert this agency into a sovereignty, whatever tends to give it a control over the States in their separate capacity, or to render them dependent on it, or subservient to it, interferes with what we understand by State Rights, and tends to destroy the independence and dignity of the States.

The States have made the Federal Government their agency only for those interests which they all hold in common. In their individual character, it has no concern with them. They assess their own taxes, contract and pay their own debts, and carry on their own schemes of internal improvement. What they do in these respects, saving and excepting the matters they have placed by the Constitution under its control, comes no more under the cognizance of the Federal Government, than what is done in France, Italy, or Turkey. What should we say, if the President of the United States in his annual Message should recommend setting apart a certain portion of our revenues for the payment of the debts of France or Great Britain? Should we not say that he was travelling out of the record, going beyond his commission? Would he be treating those powers as free and independent? Would he not assume a sort of guardianship over them? And suppose that these coun-

tries should accept the boon, and come to be pensioners on the American Treasury, would they lose nothing of their independence?

The President seems to us, we are sorry to say, to proceed on the principle, that whatever is done indirectly is not done at all. The very proposition, to distribute the revenues of the Union among the States, is an assumption of superiority, of guardianship. It is saying that the States are incapable of taking care of themselves, and so we must take care of them. And when the States have accepted this guardianship, when they have become the pensioners of the Federal Government, we ask if their freedom and dignity are enhanced thereby? Has not the Federal Government subsidized them, is it not paying them a bribe to support it? They will then assume "an attitude lofty and erect," will they?

There are constantly occurring and ever will occur cases, in which State interposition in some form will be necessary to arrest the encroachments of the Federal Government. Nothing but the fear of this, on the part of that government, can be effectual in keeping it within constitutional limits. Will a State deriving from it the means of defraying its own expenses, a pensioner on the Federal Treasury, be free to interpose its State sovereignty? Nay, will it not, by all the force of the bribe it receives, be induced to enlarge the powers of the Federal Government, to extend its jurisdiction, in the hope of deriving from its action a larger share of plunder? That moment you make the States pensioners on the bounty of the Federal Government, you destroy the balance between the States and the Union, and give to the centripetal force an overwhelming power. How then can Mr. Tyler recommend this measure as favoring the independence and dignity of the States? The reverse of his pretension is the truth.

Nor is this all. Mr. Tyler goes for an economical government. So far so good. He must know, for he has been educated in an orthodox school of politics, that the party, to whom the government pays out what it

collects, is always a plunder party, that its constant study is to devise ways and means for taxing the people to the greatest possible extent; for the more the government collects, the greater the amount to be shared among them. The greater the amount to be shared among them, the more wasteful they become, the more corrupt and remiss in the discharge of their duties; consequently, the more corrupt and oppressive must be the government, the more prodigal and extravagant in its expenditures. Now, then, is it sound policy to bring forward a measure, which affords a specious pretext for raising the taxes, and therefore enlarging the amount to be shared by the plunder party? This party cannot be satisfied with the amount they can derive from the people for the support of the Federal Government, nor by the agency of the State governments, so they must make the Federal Government an agent for collecting taxes for the States, well knowing that they and their friends will share the plunder. Is this the way to secure an economical administration, and to make its burdens as light on the people as possible?

Nor does the corrupting influence of this measure stop with the government; it reaches to the ballot box. Mr. Tyler needs not to be told, that the people will pay much more in indirect taxes than they will in direct; we need not tell him, that the money they will receive from the Federal Treasury will seem to the mass of them so much clear gain, although it has cost them thirteen per cent more than it would to have paid it directly into their own State Treasury. This *gift*, as they will call it, from the Union, will appear to them to lighten their State taxes; because this was collected by indirect taxation, and State taxes are for the most part collected by direct taxation. Now let a man come forward and propose to repeal the law distributing Federal Revenue among the States, and he will not be able to command a respectable minority. His proposition will strike the mass like a proposition to impose an additional tax on them, to the amount received by distribution. The party in favor of continuing the policy

of distribution, then, can always command a majority at the polls. They have bribed the States, bribed the voters, and can therefore plunder to their hearts' content. This, we trust, is not the *reform* we were told to expect from this new administration; nor is this what was to prepare the way for those better times we were promised.

This measure, again, it is evident, cannot be adopted without resorting to a loan or to increased taxes. Mr. Tyler tells us the revenues for the present fiscal year, including the income from the public lands, will fall short of the expenses some eleven millions of dollars or more. Of course, then, distribution is not to take effect on an overflowing, but upon an exhausted treasury, to be made not out of a surplus, but out of a deficit. But he tells us that the distribution ought not to take effect unless it can without "imposing on commerce heavier burdens than those contemplated by the Act of 1833." This at first would seem to be a recommendation, that the measure should not be adopted unless it can be without resorting to increased taxation. But Mr. Tyler does not mean this; he merely means that it ought not to take effect unless it may without increasing the taxes from what they now are beyond the twenty per cent. *ad valorem* duty, contemplated as the maximum by the Compromise Act. He does not oppose the laying of duties on articles, such as wines and silks from France, now admitted free of charge, nor to increasing the tariff of duties on all articles now admitted below the twenty per cent. maximum. He therefore leaves ample scope for additional taxation. Now, a measure requiring an express resort to taxation for other purposes than to meet the wants of the government, looks to us wretched as policy, and wicked, when we remember the Constitution of the United States. Mr. Tyler knows that the income from the public lands is revenue, for he calls it so himself; and he knows, if he will read the Constitution, that Congress has no authority to raise a revenue for the purpose of distribution. How can he then recommend it? But we leave the

constitutionality of the measure, first, because we have too much reason to fear it is an instrument that has no weight with the present administration ; and secondly, because we went largely into its consideration, as our readers will recollect, in our Review for April last.

By distribution a pretext is obtained for raising the tariff, and ostensibly for the purposes of revenue ; but since Mr. Tyler admits in his Message the principle of discriminating duties, we may see that at the bottom of all this policy, our own old enemies, the advocates of protection, are at work. The scheme of distribution is resorted to, first, for the purpose of obtaining a basis for a United States Bank ; second, for the purpose of raising the value of State stocks, and enriching those who have purchased them at a low price ; third, to afford an opportunity to raise the tariff, and enable the manufacturer to obtain additional advantages over the producer ; and lastly, to provide the ways and means of making the government a more efficient agent for plundering the people for the benefit of speculators, stock-jobbers, contractors, office-holders, and their friends ; in a word, the party to whom government pays out directly or indirectly what it takes from the mass. Whether the scheme will succeed or not, it is impossible for us to say at this moment, though perhaps it may be told with tolerable certainty before what we are writing reaches the public eye.

There are several other points in the Message we would gladly touch upon, but we have not the room to do it. All we can say in conclusion is, that it is a dark day for the Confederacy, and no true patriot can look forward without fear and trembling. The enemies of true liberty are in power, and apparently able to do what they will. But the friends of freedom, of just government, — true enlightened patriots, though in the minority, are neither few nor weak. They will acquit themselves in the contest as men ; what men may do, they will not leave undone ; and if they fall, it shall be Antæus like, to rise renovated and reinvigorated to fresh combats. To the minority in Congress we now look,

and bid them remember, that they are now called on to defend Constitutional Freedom, and also that they are on the side of truth, justice, humanity, and a righteous God, whose providence suffers nothing to escape it, will not permit their labors to go unrewarded.*

EDITOR.

ART. VIII. — LITERARY NOTICES.

Hereditary Property Justified. Reply to Brownson's Article on the Laboring Classes. Cambridge: Metcalf, Torrey, & Ballou. 1841. 8vo. pp. 51. — We notice this pamphlet because it is the only respectful reply we have seen attempted to the doctrines, we threw out sometime since on hereditary property, and because it is, we are informed, the production of an estimable young man, whose exertions to cultivate his mind and acquire a truly liberal education are worthy of all praise. We thank him for his pamphlet, which is serious and candid, displaying a cultivated mind and respectable talents. As a reply to us, we have found nothing in it that seems to demand a rejoinder. The author has hardly done himself justice. He can do better, and will, if he will take the trouble to look deeper into the subject, and seize upon certain ultimate principles to which his detached observations and reasonings may be reduced. A man to write well must not write from the surface inwards, but from the centre outwards. We have read the pamphlet very attentively, but we have not been able to ascertain on what ground the author objects to us; so we cannot say whether we are refuted or not. We must therefore be excused from attempting any reply.

We seize this occasion to say a word or two in explanation of the position we choose to occupy in regard to this doctrine of hereditary property. The community has been apparently not a little alarmed by our speculations. Their alarm, were we not of a serious make, would afford us much amusement, and perhaps has afforded us some; but now that the clamor raised against us has died into an echo, we hasten to say that it was wholly uncalled for. We never

* We have in this and the foregoing article spoken in strong terms of the policy the President has seemed to us to recommend. It may be that we have charged upon him the policy of his party, and assumed that he will support measures which he may finally oppose. If so, we shall be glad, and shall be ready to do ample justice to him; for we have always heretofore had a high respect for his character and views.

brought forward the abolition of hereditary property for the *adoption* of the community, but for its *discussion*. In considering the various means which were necessary for the real elevation of the laboring classes, we suggested, that it would ultimately be found necessary to proceed to the length of abolishing hereditary property, as had already been done in regard to hereditary monarchy, and hereditary nobility. We have as yet seen no very cogent reason assigned to show that we were wrong. We still believe that the equality, which many of our democrats are contending for, can be effected by no measure less searching and radical. But we knew well that these democrats would in general shrink from it; and one reason we had for suggesting the measure was to show, that the real elevation of the laboring classes was a work they were by no means prepared for. We were willing to expose their cant and hypocrisy, by showing them that they had by no means the nerve to look any measure in the face, sufficiently strong to effect the object they professed to have at heart. But we knew the measure could not be adopted at present, if ever; and therefore we never proposed to ourselves to embark in the Quixotic enterprise of attempting to secure its adoption. We stated at the time, that we did not propose it for adoption, that the time had not come for its adoption, and that we would be the last to bring it before the legislature. We therefore threw it out, as we said, merely for discussion, confident that its discussion could do no harm, and also that discussion would raise it up, in the long run, friends and champions. In this way we thought possibly it might after a series of ages come to be adopted. We have accomplished the purpose we had in view in bringing it forward; we have placed it before the public; made it a subject of thought; and, having said all we choose to say on it, we leave it now to make or mar its fortune. If founded in truth and justice, in some shape it will ultimately be adopted; if in error and iniquity, as the wise public say, it will of course sink to the bottomless pit, where in that case it would belong.

One word as to the elevation of the laboring classes. The manner in which our articles on the laboring classes have been received, while it gives us ground of hope for the future, and proves that the number, who really desire the elevation of the workingman, is greater than we had supposed, teaches us what we knew before, that the regard expressed for him is in general mere cant. It is fashionable to talk of his elevation, and to profess great regard for him, but the country is by no means ripe for the adoption of any measures that will give him an equal rank in society. The day of his redemption is not yet. It will dawn we hope. *En attendant*, all we can do for him seems to be, to labor earnestly for the establishment of a just and economical government, and especially of a sound system of finance, by means of which labor shall secure a larger portion of its proceeds. We see nothing else that can be *done* at present, except the free and full discussion of all principles and measures having or likely to have a bearing on the mutual relation of capital and labor. The measures which might be effectual are now so repugnant to prevailing convictions, that all hope of securing their adoption should be abandoned.

Names and Titles of the Lord Jesus Christ. By CHARLES SPEAR. Fourth Edition. Boston: B. B. Mussey and Abel Tompkins. 1841. 12mo. pp. 400. — This book would seem to be, as the trade would say, a successful one; for although it has been published but a few months, it has already reached a fourth edition. We have read it, not very attentively, but sufficiently to perceive that it is the production of a serious, earnest mind, disposed to religious reflection, and possessed of much genuine religious feeling. The book is rather a devotional book than otherwise, and is quite creditable to the industry, the acquirements, the intellect, and the heart of the writer. It is a book from which we doubt not many may derive much spiritual nutriment.

The theology of the book, however, is not in accordance with ours. Mr. Spear does not take that view of the Saviour, which after many, many years of doubt and inquiry, we have been led to take. He is not a Trinitarian nor yet a Humanitarian, but seems to favor what is sometimes called the Superangelic scheme. He appears to have shrunk from relying on Jesus as a man, and to have been unable to perceive the strict identity of the Son with the Father, and so gets for a Saviour a being neither God nor man. The doctrine of the two natures, it seems to us, would have saved him from this, to us, least excusable of all hypotheses with regard to the Saviour. The conclusion to which our inquiries have led us is, that the Saviour was very God and very man, and in him we see the union of perfect God and perfect man. The Christ is one with God, was God, and the Christ, the true God, was incarnated in the man Jesus, a true man, and type of the perfect man. Mr. Spear's error comes therefore from not being able to admit the mystery of the two natures.

The low view which he takes of Christ, and his want of true spiritual insight, may be collected from the following. "The word Christ is frequently used by Paul as a trope, denoting sometimes the Christian spirit and temper, as when he says, 'My little children, of whom I travail in birth again, until Christ be formed in you.'" We have not been in the habit of regarding the word Christ here as a trope, but as used literally. We had supposed that Christ must be formed literally, not figuratively in us, before we could be Christians, and we are in the habit also of regarding the Christian spirit and temper as manifestation of the true, real indwelling Christ. The want of this spiritual insight gives after all a cold and material aspect to the book, forbidding and unsatisfactory to the man of deep inward religious experiences. We find much in it to commend, many eloquent remarks and much power; but we do not find our Saviour in it, the Son of God, one with the Father, through whom alone we can be cleansed from all sin, and presented blameless at the last day.